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ABSTRACT

For the last several decades, it has been apparent that new methods of identifying
explosives can help investigators trace their origins. One way to identify an explosive is
through the use of taggants: materials added to a product that encodes information about
the product such as when it was manufactured.
This research investigates the survivability of a new identification taggant called
the Nuclear Barcode that overcomes some of the downfalls that have been identified in
prior taggants. The Nuclear Barcode encodes information as a unique combination of
concentrations of rare earths (Ho, Eu, Sm, Lu, and Dy) and precious metals (Ir, Rh, and
Re) that is then identified using Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA). The concept of
“survivability” was tested through a series of experiments on aqueous solutions and postblast residues containing three rare earths (Ho, Eu, and Sm).
The tests have shown that the three candidate taggant elements can be identified by
NAA in an aqueous solution at concentrations as low as 100 parts per billion (ppb) with
uncertainties in the concentration measurement as low as 5 ppb. These elements can be
identified in post-blast residue produced by a detonating explosive at higher concentrations
of 1,000 ppb. Being able to identify the taggant elements at these concentrations is critical
for the practical implementation of the Nuclear Barcode, which requires uncertainties
below 50 ppb. Five parameters were identified as contributing to the uncertainty and the
effect of the delay time was investigated. After a period of 2.5 half-lives, the uncertainty
in the concentration was found to be higher than the uncertainty immediately afterward,
suggesting that samples be measured as soon as possible and eliminating some candidates.
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1. INTRODUCTION

This research investigated the detectability and measurability of three rare earth
elements: holmium, samarium, and europium, in post-blast residue by neutron activation
analysis (NAA). NAA provides an advantage over chemical techniques in that it detects
the presence of elements by properties of their nucleus, which is not destroyed during the
detonation process, as opposed to interatomic bonds that are probed by chemical and
physical techniques such as infra-red spectroscopy. The detectability and measurability of
these three elements was also evaluated when dissolved in aqueous solutions, which serve
as simulants for undetonated explosives. Aqueous solutions can stand in for undetonated
explosives because the major constituents of explosives (carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, and
hydrogen) are effectively inert under NAA due to their low atomic numbers. Comparing
these tests allows for understanding of the performance of NAA as a method for measuring
concentrations of the three rare earth elements in post-blast residue. This will enable
further research into additional identification taggants that can be used in explosives.
While performing this research, an observation was made about the effect of the
delay time between irradiating and counting the samples during the process of performing
NAA. This observation prompted further experiments that were performed to investigate
the relationship between the delay time and the measured concentration and its uncertainty,
which is defined mathematically in Section 2.2.2. These tests provide information about
methods of optimizing testing of post-blast residue samples by NAA. These results provide
additional information about the performance and suitability of NAA as an analytical
method for further identification taggant research.

2
1.1. RESEARCH MOTIVATION FOR AN IDENTIFICATION TAGGANT
Terrorist attacks involving explosives have long been a challenge for investigators
[1, 2]. The use of explosives often destroys items that might be used as evidence, and often
makes identification of the type of explosive used difficult [3]. Additionally, this type of
crime has resulted in some of the highest numbers of casualties of any crime, such as the
bombing of the Edgar Murrah Building in 1995, which killed or injured approximately 850
people [2]. Developing a technology that provides critical information about the explosive,
post detonation, could speed up investigations, or provide leads that may not be otherwise
followed up on by providing novel methods of tracing back to purchase orders or other
methods of determining the perpetrators.
One technology that could be used to provide this type of identification is a taggant.
A taggant is a foreign material that is added to a product that provides information about
that material. A taggant can be a physical object such as a particle, or it can be a chemical
additive [1, 4].

Taggants can fall under two classifications: detection taggants and

identification taggants. As the name suggests, detection taggants are something that is
added to a material to enhance the detectability of that material. A common example is the
small quantity of sulfur containing chemical compounds that are added to natural gas or
propane at part per million levels. The addition of these sulfur compounds gives these
normally odorless hydrocarbons “their” distinctive scent.
Identification taggants are the second class of taggants, and the one relevant to this
dissertation. An identification taggant is something that is added to a product that provides
information about that product.

This information could include things like the

manufacturer, what the material is, or when the material was manufactured. Identification
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taggants have been used in several places to encode this type of information to prevent
theft or counterfeiting of goods such as currency, clothing, or pharmaceuticals [4, 5].
An explosive identification taggant can encode information about the manufacturer,
the type of explosive, and the batch number of the explosive material. If that tagged
explosive is used in a terrorist attack, or in another criminal act, investigators could then
use the taggant to “read” this information assuming that the taggant survived detonation.
Knowing this information would then enable the investigation to focus tracing that
particular batch of explosives. This could speed up investigations by reducing the amount
of work, or prevent further attacks if more explosives are discovered to be missing.
Identification taggants for explosives are not a new concept. Federal proposals for
their inclusion in manufactured explosives were drafted 40 years ago, but were not
ultimately acted upon [1, 2]. However, studies on introducing identification taggants have
identified a number of criteria that a successful identification taggant must satisfy:
survivability, recoverability, utility, compatibility with explosives, safety in manufacture
and use, no effect on explosive performance or use, compatibility with mined products,
environmental acceptability, and cost [1, 2]. These criteria are described in Table 1.1. A
full discussion of these criteria is available throughout Section 2. Should an identification
taggant technology satisfy these criteria, there is a high likelihood that such a technology
can be practically implemented.
Identification taggants have been used in Switzerland since 1980. All explosives
produced in Switzerland or imported for use in Switzerland must contain a taggant. Swiss
authorities have credited the taggant program with improving the rate at which crimes
involving explosives were solved.

4
Table 1.1. Successful Explosives Identification Taggant Criteria. adapted from [1, 2]
Criterion
Survivability
Recoverability
Utility
Compatibility with Explosives
Safety in manufacture and use
No effect on explosive
performance
Compatibility with mined products
Environmental acceptability
Cost

Description
Taggant must not be destroyed (rendered
unreadable) by the detonation of the explosive
Taggant must be able to be found in post-blast
environment
Taggant must encode information useful for law
enforcement investigations
Addition of taggant must not cause instability in
the explosive that makes handling and storing the
explosive unsafe or effect shelf life
Taggant must not pose a health hazard to
manufacturers of and users of tagged explosives
Taggant must not reduce explosive performance
nor significantly increase or decrease sensitivity
of tagged explosive material
Taggant must not contaminate any mined
resources to the extent that the resource cannot be
extracted
Taggant must be non-toxic, and non-polluting
Taggant must be cheap relative to the cost of
explosives and also cheap enough that analyzing
tagged explosives is feasible in all cases

In the first 14 years of the taggant program, 44% of crimes involving explosives
were solved when a taggant was recovered. Only 16% of crimes involving explosives were
solved when no taggant was recovered. In total, a crime where explosives were used was
2.8 times more likely to be solved when taggants were used [2].

1.2. THE NUCLEAR BARCODE: A NOVEL IDENTIFICATION TAGGANT
This dissertation discusses the early development of a new identification taggant
candidate, called the Nuclear Barcode. The Nuclear Barcode encodes information about
the explosives as a unique combination of concentrations of certain rare metals. In 2014,
3.1 million metric tons of explosives (including blasting agents such as ANFO) were
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consumed in the United States [6]. Therefore, the Nuclear Barcode must be able to produce
a very large number of unique codes.
Since several of the metals used in the proposed Nuclear Barcode are expensive,
very low concentrations of these metals must be used to keep the cost low enough to be
viable as an identification taggant. The most expensive metal used is iridium, with a cost
of $1,200 per troy ounce in 2018. Concentrations ranging from 100 parts per billion (ppb)
to 4,000 ppb are proposed, with concentration levels separated by 100 ppb. This produces,
for eight taggant elements, a total of 6.56 trillion unique combinations. To utilize the
Nuclear Barcode, the concentrations of the taggant elements must be able to be read with
sufficient precision to place the concentration within one concentration level. With the 100
ppb separation between levels, this would require that the measurement technique has a
precision of 50 ppb. One such technique, for the elements under consideration, is NAA
which is described further in Section 2.2.
NAA works by bombarding a sample with neutrons. The nuclei of the atoms in the
sample occasionally absorb one of these neutrons and convert to a radioactive isotope of
the same element. When this radioactive nucleus decays, it emits a number of gamma
photons at different energies that is characteristic of that particular isotope. These gamma
photons can be counted using a detector, and the quantity of the radioactive isotope can be
determined. Using this information, it is possible to determine the elemental composition
of the original sample.
Neutron activation analysis provides a similar level of metrological certainty to
Isotope Dilution Mass Spectroscopy, which is a primary method of measurement according
to the Comité Consultatif pour la Quantité de Matière — Métrologie en Chimie (CCQM)
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[7]. Metrological certainty as a principal means that the measured quantity is both
accurately and precisely determined by the method chosen. By the CCQM’s definition, a
primary method of measurement “A primary method of measurement is a method having
the highest metrological properties [that is, a method that is extremely precise], whose
operation can be completely described and understood, for which a complete uncertainty
statement [the uncertainty in the measured quantity is completely determined by the test
method and any preparation steps, and there is no random component that contributes to
uncertainty] can be written down in terms of SI units” [7]. The use of primary methods of
measurement provides certainty that the results are both accurate and precise.

The

individual elements in the Nuclear Barcode will have different limits of detectability and
also different levels of uncertainty. An explanation for these can be found in Section 2.2.
Using the nuclear barcode involves several steps. The first step is creating the
identification taggant. For the nuclear barcode, the identification taggant is the unique
combination of concentration levels of each of the eight elements used. This taggant is
added to explosives during manufacturing in such a way that the taggant is well dispersed
among the final product. When the explosive is detonated, the taggant elements remain
behind in the solid phase as post-blast residue, which can be recovered by swabbing
surfaces that collect post-blast residue with a cotton ball or another sampling implement.
Finally, post-blast samples are subjected to NAA. NAA allows the concentrations of the
taggant elements to be determined and reads the barcode. This dissertation investigated
the scientific feasibility of this identification taggant.
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1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This research focuses on investigating the survivability of the Nuclear Barcode
concept over other components listed in Table 1.1. Survivability of the Nuclear Barcode
is the most important aspect, as without survivability, the other components listed in Table
1.1 do not matter. Due to the nature of testing for survivability, as well as the exact method
of encoding information chosen in the Nuclear Barcode, there is an unavoidable overlap
between the concept of survivability and the concept of recoverability. In doing so, the
concept of survivability was broken down into a series of four objectives, such that if the
Nuclear Barcode can satisfy these objectives, then it can be considered a survivable
identification taggant. The four objectives are:

1. Determine if the taggant elements can be detected and quantified via NAA at the
desired concentrations.

2. Determine if the different concentration levels of the taggant elements can be
distinguished via NAA with sufficient precision that the measured concentration
lies within only one concentration level (50 ppb precision to use the Nuclear
Barcode as designed).

3. Determine the distinguishability of the taggant elements from background signals,
including other taggant elements and common elements in the environment such as
sodium, potassium, chlorine, etc.
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4. Identify concentrations of the taggant elements in the post blast residues and verify
them to be the same as in the undetonated sample.

These four objectives address both the qualitative and quantitative use of NAA.
The qualitative use of NAA allows for the identification of different elements that are
present in a single sample. Quantitative use of NAA determines the mass of at least one
element that is present in the sample. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis can often
be performed using the same test data but it is possible in some cases that only qualitative
data can be obtained.

Of the four objectives listed, only objective three is purely

qualitative. Objectives one, two, and four combine both qualitative use of NAA by
evaluating if the taggant element(s) can be identified and quantitative use of NAA by
evaluating how much of the taggant element(s) is present in the sample. A series of eight
tests was designed based on these four objectives. These tests were designed to build off
of one another, while still providing information should the Nuclear Barcode fail a specific
test. These tests are extensively described in Sections 4 and 5. While analyzing the results
of these tests, five parameters involved in the calculation of the mass of an element by
NAA were determined to be significant contributors to the results. Due to this, an
additional series of tests on one of these, the delay time, was carried out. The delay time
is the time between exposing the sample to neutrons and the counting the sample on a
detector capable of detecting gamma photons. The five parameters identified by this
testing are described in Section 5.10, and the delay time tests are described in detail in
Section 6.
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1.4. CONTRIBUTION TO SCIENCE
This dissertation discusses the survivability of three rare earth elements: holmium,
samarium, and europium in post-blast residues produced by explosives using NAA. This
research identifies these elements, measures their concentrations, and determines the
effects of delay time on the uncertainty in their measured concentrations. Detectability of
these elements is a crucial component towards the implementation of an identification
taggant scheme, the Nuclear Barcode, that has been developed based off of this work.
Detectability of these elements by NAA was found to be dependent on a total of five
parameters: the neutron flux that the samples are exposed to; the efficiency of the detector
used; the length of time the sample is irradiated; the length of time the sample is counted;
and the delay time, the length of time between the irradiation and counting of the sample.
This last parameter was the most varied during testing due to scheduling needs and safety
concerns. These parameters are discussed more fully in Section 2.2 and Section 5.10.
Additionally, this dissertation examines the effects of the delay time between
irradiating and counting the samples on the measured concentration and concentration
uncertainties in aqueous solutions of holmium when analyzed using NAA. The delay time
arises from necessity for some samples, which become too active after irradiation to safely
handle until enough time passes. The measurements of the concentrations of holmium and
the measured concentration uncertainties were compared based on the number of half-lives
of holmium-166 that elapsed between irradiation and the start of the measurement. Based
on these tests, the uncertainty in the measured concentration is minimized by measuring
the sample before 2.5 half-lives have elapsed. In real time, this means that samples
containing holmium should be measured within 67 hours of irradiating, samples containing
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europium should be measured within 23 hours of irradiating, and samples containing
samarium should be measured within 115 hours of irradiating. These results will have
consequences for optimizing the use of NAA as an analytical method with post-blast
residues.

1.5. ORGANIZATION OF THIS DOCUMENT
This dissertation discusses the history and development of identification taggants
in Section 2.1. This discussion is then followed by a review of the literature required to
understand the foundational technology of NAA in Section 2.2, and a review of the basic
properties of explosives in Section 2.3. Section 3 describes the concept of the nuclear
barcode, an identification taggant that is read by NAA. Section 4 describes a series of eight
tests that were performed to evaluate the four research objectives outlined in Section 1.3.
Section 5 presents the results with an analysis of the tests outlined in Section 4, ultimately
identifying five parameters important for controlling the uncertainty of NAA. The effects
of one of them, the time delay between irradiating a sample and counting it, is presented in
Section 6. Section 7 presents a discussion of the consequences of the results shown in
Sections 5 and 6 and provides a cost estimate of the materials involved in the Nuclear
Barcode. Conclusions regarding this research are presented in Section 8, and an overview
of future work to enable the use of the Nuclear Barcode is presented in Section 9.
Appendices A and B cover details of the calculation of the concentration of the taggant
elements identified by NAA and the method by which one parameter was determined
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respectively. Appendix C breaks up Figure 5.1, adds additional figures according to
individual element, and presents additional information about the data used to create Figure
5.1.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section discusses prior research into identification taggants and NAA. A
review of identification taggants research is presented in Section 2.1 and describes
previously developed identification taggants and the circumstances under which they were
developed. This review provides the context in which the taggant evaluation criteria in
Table 1.1 were developed. Additionally, Section 2.1.3 compares previously developed
taggants to a key subset of those criteria, foremost of which is survivability.
A review of the process of NAA is presented in Section 2.2. This review describes
the mechanism by which NAA operates and how this can be used to determine the
composition of a sample. Additionally, Section 2.2.2 includes disciplines where NAA is
used to analyze low concentrations of rare earth elements in a bulk sample, which is the
same use case that will be presented in Sections 3 through 6.
A review of explosives is presented in Section 2.3. Section 2.3.1 discusses the
chemistry of detonation and predicts the formation of post-blast residue that remains after
detonation. Section 2.3.2 discusses the characterization of explosives as low or high
explosives; and as primary, secondary, or tertiary explosives. Section 2.3.3 discusses the
performance of explosives and identifies key parameters for predicting this performance.

2.1. TAGGANTS LITERATURE REVIEW
Regulations governing explosives have often included requirements to provide
information about the manufacturer, type, and batch of a commercially produced explosive.
The first method of encoding information about an explosive was simply writing the
desired information on the explosive’s packaging. Marking explosives in this way can be
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considered the first identification taggant. Identification taggants that encode this
information have evolved over the course of over 100 years in the United States. The
United States is being used as a general example of how taggant developments have been
reactive, but developments have also occurred in other countries such as Switzerland.
Identification taggants are particularly useful as they allow explosives to be tracked back
to the manufacturer and purchaser. Correlations can be seen in the evolutional advances
in identification taggants and events (wars and terrorist activities) that lead to regulations
governing explosives. The information presented in this section walks through the
evolution of identification taggants, since 1917, and attempts to identify the corresponding
event that led to increased regulations governing explosives. The section illustrates that the
efforts in identification taggants have been primarily reactionary and highlights the need
for a more proactive approach in taggant research and implementation. Understanding the
previously developed identification taggants has led to successive generations of taggant
candidates. These taggant candidates each improve on some of the shortcomings of the
previously developed identification taggants.
2.1.1. Overview. Commercial explosives are a valuable resource used in
industries such as mining and construction. Throughout history, terrorist attacks and
accidents have demonstrated the potential for misuse of commercial explosive materials to
cause harm to both people and property [2]. Balancing the economic value of explosives
while minimizing the destructive risks has been a topic of both scientific interest and
government policy for over one hundred years in the United States [1, 2].
Regulations exist to reduce the misuse of explosives by addressing aspects such as
the use, transport, and storage of these materials. These regulations have been historically
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enacted in response to new external circumstances such as war, increased concerns over
terrorism, new technology, and new uses for explosives. This reactive approach means
that there are inevitable loopholes that can be found by a motivated party that will only be
closed after an unfortunate event. Regulations governing explosives have often included
requirements to provide information about the manufacturer, type, and batch of a
commercially produced explosive. Taggants are one technology that has been developed
to identify explosives. This section will discuss those developments occurring in the
United States specifically, but other taggant developments have occurred in other countries
as well; the United States here is being used as a representative example.
There are two categories of taggants used with explosives: detection taggants and
identification taggants. Detection taggants are designed to make explosives easier to detect
and enable a sensor to produce a signal when explosives are present. One implementation
of detection taggants is adding volatile chemicals to certain types of plasticized explosives.
Unlike untagged explosives, bomb-sniffing dogs (for example) can detect these volatile
chemicals by smell [2]. Additional technologies designed to detect either these volatile
chemicals or other components of the explosive itself are used in the equipment present at
airports or government buildings. Detection taggants and their attendant technologies will
not be further discussed in this dissertation. Identification taggants provide information
about the explosive when they are recovered. The key distinction between detection
taggants and identification taggants is that identification taggants cannot be used until the
explosive has been located. Once found, either detonated or undetonated, the identification
taggant can be read, and the information about the explosive can be retrieved. This
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information may contain the manufacturer of the explosive, the type of the explosive, or
other information such as batch or lot number.
Identification taggants are used in many fields such as pharmaceuticals and
automotive manufacturing to provide information about materials [4]. For example, to
prove the source or manufacturer of a product to safeguard against counterfeits [5], or for
tracing materials that are then used to produce unlicensed copies or illegal goods [5].
The technology used to create and encode identification taggants has changed over
time, and many different approaches have been developed such as: small particles,
biological sensors, radionuclides, and combinations of chemical compounds. Additionally,
simply writing information such as the manufacturer or batch on a casing around an
explosive can be considered an identification taggant, since it encodes information about
the explosive. Tagging explosives in some way that provides information about the
explosive has been pursued for more than 100 years [8]. This review shows the progression
of taggant technology and how it relates to specific events. Taggant technologies have
progressed over the course of the 100 years of development and have identified key
characteristics of a successful taggant.
2.1.2. Historic Events and Their Relation to Taggant Development. To have a
clear understanding and proactive look at the development of new identification taggants,
it is important to know the history that has shaped explosives regulations and requirements
for manufacturers over time. A timeline of events and laws passed within the United States
that surround identification taggants for explosives is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1. History of Identification Taggants Timeline in the US

From the events and laws shown in Figure 2.1, there have been four eras of
identification taggant development: the early explosives regulations era, the initial taggants
era, the updated taggants era, and the modern taggants era.
Early explosives regulations (1917-1970). Identification taggants are
an additive to an explosive that provides information about the explosive. The earliest
method used to provide this information was to encase the explosive in some wrapper that
had information such as the manufacturer or type of explosive printed on it. The Explosives
Act of 1917 standardized requirements for: licensing, manufacturing, storing, and
distributing explosives and explosive ingredients in the United States upon the nation’s
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entry into World War 1. One of the main concerns was over the availability of explosives
for acts of sabotage or “bomb outrages”; acts that would be called terrorism today. This
measure was intended to be a temporary one, applying only during the war, and its
provisions expired in 1919 [8]. An almost identical law, the Federal Explosives Act, was
passed upon the United States’ entry into World War 2 in 1941, with updated language and
an updated list of explosive ingredients. This law, like the 1917 version, also was explicitly
a wartime measure and expired at the end of World War 2. The passage of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 introduced permanent federal regulations for explosives in Title
IX for the first time.

Explosives Act of 1917. Due to the exceptional circumstance of the
United States entering into World War 1, a uniform set of rules and regulations surrounding
explosives was deemed necessary [8, 9]. The Explosives Act of 1917 was the first federal
law passed regulating explosives. Prior to the passage of this act, explosives regulations
were left to the states and municipalities. Some states and cities had significant regulations
on explosives that were used as a template for the regulations coming from this act, while
other states had no regulations on explosives, and these new regulations were the first to
apply in these localities [8].
To reduce the possibility of misuse, the Explosives Act of 1917 required users and
manufacturers of explosives to obtain a license. This license could only be issued by a
designated authority and would include information about the licensee and required
certification that the licensee was a loyal citizen of the United States [8]. Strictly following
the wording of the Explosives Act of 1917 would require purchasers of approximately
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1,500 materials, including things such as cotton or starch, to hold an explosives license [8].
As this would be impractical, the list of materials that would require licensure was reduced
to oxidizers commonly used in explosives such as ammonium nitrate, as well as
commercially produced explosives like nitroglycerin [8].

Additionally, sellers of

explosives were required to verify that purchasers had the proper license and issue receipts
that contained a description of the intended use for the explosives [8].
The increased burden on law-abiding citizens placed by the Explosives Act of 1917
was justified, due to the extraordinary circumstances of World War 1 [8, 9]. With the war’s
end, the law expired, and its provisions were no longer enforced. The Explosives Act of
1917 was credited with significant reductions in the availability of explosives for crimes
or terrorism, as well as, injuries and damage from unintentional detonations caused by
improper storage [8]. Due to the efficacy of this program, permanently implementing this
act was discussed to resolve issues stemming from anarchists and other movements that
were engaging in domestic terrorism [8]. Ultimately, no provision was made to adopt the
Explosives Act of 1917 as a permanent law.

Federal Explosives Act (1941). With the entry of the United States in
World War 2, the same concerns arose surrounding the use of explosives that were present
before the passage of the Explosives Act of 1917. Despite the lack of an official declaration
of war, the provisions of the Explosives Act of 1917 were revived sometime between the
beginning of World War Two and the end of 1940 [10]. After declaring war, the Federal
Explosives Act was passed on December 26, 1941 [11]. This act amended and renamed
the Explosives Act of 1917 [11]. The amendments were small details such as changing the
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list of explosives ingredients, not significantly altering the original 1917 act [11]. Notably,
at the end of the war and thus the expiration of the act, the regulations stayed in place with
the Federal Explosives Act.

Additionally, the new Federal Explosives Act also

implemented similar regulations to the ones drafted for the 1917 act, with expanded
sections on storage and transport [11]. Overall, the changes to the Explosives Act of 1917
by the Federal Explosives Act were not substantial. The primary purpose was the same
with both acts: prevent the use of explosives during wartime by those intending on using
them against the United States’ government.

Organized Crime Control Act (1970). By 1970, there had been
sufficient change in society to require a more extensive set of regulations outside of a
formally declared state of war. The additional requirement of marking explosives with a
manufacturer, type of explosive, and a date or batch code also shows the change in societal
opinion of the necessity of explosives regulations. Domestic bombings by groups such as
the bombing of the State Department Building in Washington, DC by Weather
Underground in 1975, as well as other bombings throughout the 1960s and 1970s presented
new challenges for investigators [12]. In the period between 1917 and 1970, federal
explosives regulations evolved from an emergency proposal implemented due to the World
Wars to a fully-fledged regulatory regime recognizable today in the modern Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). This new regulatory regime stands in
contrast to the ones created under the original Explosives Act passed in 1917, and the
refreshed 1941 version. These two acts created regulations specifically applicable only
during wartime that: “The operation of this law will doubtless cause inconvenience to
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persons engaged in legitimate business; it may embarrass worthy citizens in the pursuit of
their livelihood…” [9].
With the passage of the Organized Crime Control Act in 1970, federal explosives
law continued to evolve. Title IX of the act permanently enacted updated requirements in
the same style as the earlier Explosives Act of 1917 and the Federal Explosives Act of
1941. The Organized Crime Control Act effected regulations of every aspect of explosives,
though with less effect on transportation. It also implemented, for the first time, federal
explosives regulations while the country was not at war [13]. Many of these regulations
have been updated in the 48 years since the passage of the Organized Crime Control Act,
but they all originated from this law [13]. Additionally, the act also gave the ATF federal
regulatory responsibility for all explosives, where it remains today [13].
The Organized Crime Control Act required that all explosives manufactured after
February 12, 1971, were to bear a label with the manufacturer, type of explosive, and a
date or batch code [13]. These markings were required to be on the wrappings immediately
around the explosives (identification taggant), such as a cartridge or bag [13]. Requiring a
manufacturer label on the packaging of the explosive enables undetonated explosives to be
identified and tracked with every sale. However, this method of tagging explosives is
easily defeated by simply removing the markings or by detonating the explosives, although
parts of the wrappings may survive, it is unlikely that enough of the identifying information
will survive to be useful. Table 2.1 summarizes the different events and reactions prompted
between 1917 and 1970.
Initial taggants (1971-1980). Manufacturer information included on
the wrappings, labels, or receipts can be lost by simply removing this labeling, or by
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Table 2.1. Summary of Events and Reactions between 1917 and 1970
Event
US involvement in
World War 1
US involvement in
World War 2
Increased Domestic
Bombings

•

Reaction
Passage of Explosives Act of 1917 – First federal
regulation governing explosives
Passage of Federal Explosives Act of 1941

•
•

Passage of Organized Crime Control Act in 1970
Initial taggant research efforts begin

•

detonation, which will destroy any wrappings around the explosive. This deficiency was
recognized almost immediately by the ATF and others in government who began
investigating better methods in 1972 [14]. In 1974, the Advisory Committee on Explosives
Tagging, consisting of eleven government agencies and three external groups, was formed
to investigate methods of implementing identification taggants. A study began in 1976 on
the most promising candidates run by Aerospace Corporation [14].
In 1978, the Senate Judiciary Committee began hearings on the bill, ‘S. 2013’, that
would require the use of identification taggants and detection taggants in explosives
manufactured for use in the United States [14]. Approximately a year later in 1979, the
Senate Committee on Government Affairs was considering a separate bill, ‘S. 333’ that
would impose the same tagging requirements as part of a larger anti-terrorism bill [1]. The
first bill, under consideration by the Judiciary Committee, held hearings for approximately
a year and a half that included testimony from many sources, including the ATF and the
company running the taggant study that had begun in 1976 [14]. The Congressional Office
of Technology Assessment (OTA) was enlisted to provide a report, entitled Taggants in
Explosives to the Committee on Government Affairs, and also used the information gleaned
from the same taggant study [1].
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The research conducted for the ATF by Aerospace Corporation and reported on in
Taggants in Explosives was the first large-scale test program developed for identification
taggants in the United States [1, 14]. As such, an important objective was first to define
the evaluation criteria for a successful identification taggant. Five taggant evaluation areas
were decided upon as the most important areas to determine if a particular taggant method
would be effective:

1. Taggant recoverability – the ability of the taggant to be collected in the field
despite the debris and other material present in a post-blast environment.

2. Survivability of the taggant – the ability to read the information encoded
from the recovered taggant even after being in the explosion.

3. Utility – the amount of additional information the taggant could provide for
investigations after the taggant was recovered and the information read.

4. Compatibility of the taggant with explosives – any change to the properties
of the explosive such as its sensitivity, the amount of energy released,
stability in storage, or other properties because of the introduction of an
identification taggant.
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5. Cost of a taggant program – the cost of the taggant itself, and additional
costs to manufacturers, sellers, and regulators for tracking the new taggants,
and any other costs a taggant program might impose [1].

Three categories of explosives taggants had been developed by the writing of
Taggants in Explosives in 1980 and could be evaluated using these criteria: radiological,
chemical, and physical taggants [1].
Radiological taggants were the first category of identification taggant under
consideration, where one or more radioactive isotopes are added to the explosive to serve
as an identifier. Detection of radioactive materials has been well developed, thus allowing
radiological taggants to be recovered rapidly [1]. Since radiological taggants depend on
the presence of particular isotopes, they are unchanged during the process of detonation.
Recovering and reading taggants based on them does, however, require specialized lab
equipment and procedures unlikely to be available for police work [1]. Radiological
taggants provide two advantages. First, there are a large number of available radioactive
isotopes that can potentially be used, which provides the potential for many unique
identifiers or including more information [1]. Additionally, radiological taggants emit
radiation, which enables them to serve as detection taggants as well as identification
taggants. While this behavior makes detecting radiological taggants easy, it also poses a
potential health hazard by exposing people who work with explosives, such as blasters and
manufacturers, to radiation.

This might also cause additional regulatory costs to

manufacturers since workers exposed to radiation as part of their job fall under additional
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regulations [1]. There are also potential issues of public backlash with anything that
potentially could expose the public to radiation [1].
Chemical taggants were the second category. One chemical taggant was discussed,
but not tested, in Taggants in Explosives that was based on combinations of different
concentrations of ethanol solutions of rare earth salts [1]. This taggant could then be
recovered from the post-blast residue. This proposed chemical taggant system relied on
identifying the rare earth elements and their concentrations, which would survive
detonation. Other proposed chemical taggants might not survive detonation due to the
high-temperature environment created during the detonation process.

This chemical

taggant provided a sufficient number of unique combinations of rare earth elements and
concentrations that would provide many potential codes [1]. The reason this taggant was
not tested was that the ethanol solutions could cause sensitization of the explosives, which
would make handling more difficult. Unlike radiological taggants, there was no handheld,
portable technology developed to detect the presence of a chemical taggant rapidly; so
complex laboratory analysis would be needed [1].

The identification procedure and

equipment for reading the identification taggant are complicated and require specialized
equipment, which increases the cost of reading the taggant, and would not be available for
forensics work in 1980 [1].
Physical taggants were the third category discussed, and the only category to
undergo significant testing as part of the research conducted by Aerospace Corporation.
Initially, two physical taggants were to be tested, one developed by 3M Corporation that
was composed of small particles made from stacked colored layers of plastic, and one
developed by Westinghouse composed of small ceramic particles doped with fluorescent
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rare earth compounds. These particles were small and designed to be introduced in
relatively large numbers such that removing each of the individual particles would not be
humanly possible. Due to concerns over liability, the Westinghouse taggant was not tested
during this research program [1]. The physical taggant developed by 3M can be both
recovered and read with simple equipment in the field on a theoretical basis, but it was
determined that performing both of these tasks in the lab would be necessary in practice.
In order to read the code, the taggant particles must be separated from the debris present at
the blast site; these separation procedures were, however, determined to be simple, and can
be performed with a small amount of training [1]. Testing of the 3M taggant showed that
a number of particles would survive and be readable using a microscope [1]. The sequence
of colors in the taggant particle encodes information, and a ten-layer particle with ten
different colors produces a large number of codes. Theoretically, only one particle would
need to be recovered, but increased accuracy could be obtained when additional particles
were found [1]. The 3M taggant was tested with a range of different commercial explosive
products and found to be compatible with all but one booster material, and one variety of
smokeless powder [1]. The cost of tagging an explosive with 0.05% by weight using the
3M taggant was calculated as being a 2.3% to 23.5% increase depending on the type of
explosive being considered, with the largest percentage increase coming from detonating
cord which had the lowest cost basis [1].
The testing performed by Aerospace Corporation and the cost analysis performed
in Taggants in Explosives show that the 3M physical taggant was a viable identification
taggant, assuming the few material incompatibilities could be resolved [1]. This made the
3M taggant a very promising candidate. In 1978, two bills were under consideration in the
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United States Senate, though ultimately, neither Senate Bill #2013 nor Senate Bill #333
became law. Senate Bill #2013, under consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee,
raised concerns by the committee members about whether the proposal included black and
smokeless powders used in ammunition [14]. If these two materials were covered,
additional concerns over the compatibility and cost were raised [14]. This uncertainty
appears to have caused discussion on this bill to stop. Senate bill 333, which prompted the
writing of Taggants in Explosives, required additional study [1]. As written, the bill would
involve tagging any explosive material, including blasting agents such as ammonium
nitrate, as well as black and smokeless powders [1]. The costs of implementing a taggant
program while covering these materials increased the total program cost to an estimated
268 million dollars a year in the most comprehensive program [1]. The cost estimate was
likely the reason for the failure of this second bill.

Table 2.2 summarizes the events that

occurred between 1971 and 1980, and reactions into investigating identification taggants.
Updated taggants (1981-1998). After the publication of Taggants in
Explosives, identification taggant research continued in both government and industry [2,
15]. Taggants in Explosives recommended one of three courses of action:

1. Enact legislation requiring the addition of identification taggants contingent
on the technical feasibility

2. Do not pass legislation but recommend research into identification taggants
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3. Take no legislative action and encourage the executive branch to enhance
alternative methods of investigating taggants [1].

Table 2.2. Summary of Events and Reactions between 1971 and 1980
Event
Passage of Organized
Crime Control Act
(1970)
Senate Bill 2013 (1978)

Senate Bill 333 (1978)
Taggants In Explosives
(1980)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Reaction
Initial taggants created
Considered taggant requirements for all explosives
Raises concerns over compatibility with taggant in
black powder and smokeless powder used for sport
shooting
Considered taggant requirements for all explosives
Commissioned Taggants in Explosives
Identified evaluation criteria for successful
identification taggant
Identified cost, survivability, and compatibility with
explosives as major areas
Provided three recommended courses of action

Congress opted to specifically ban appropriations for taggant programs by the ATF from
1981 to 1993 [2].
As a direct result of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma
City in 1995, also influenced by the World Trade Center bombing in 1993, another reactive
investigation into the state of identification taggants began [2]. The 1996 Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act required the compilation of a report of the effectiveness
of taggants for explosives [2]. This report was published by the National Research Council
in 1998 under the name Containing the Threat from Illegal Bombings: An Integrated
National Strategy for Marking, Tagging, Rendering Inert, and Licensing Explosives and
Their Precursors. This report henceforth referred to as Marking and Rendering Inert,
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provided a second comprehensive look at the state of taggant technologies, their utility,
and the potential for future legislation requiring identification taggants and other
technologies to guard against explosives [2].
This report defined three types of identification taggants that were developed or
under development in between the publication of Taggants in Explosives and 1998. The
first type of identification taggant that Marking and Rendering Inert identified was a
particulate taggant. This is another name for a physical taggant and was so named due to
the fact that the physical taggants developed at the time were mostly small particles [2].
The second type of identification taggant that was named was an isotopic taggant. This is
similar to a chemical taggant where various chemical compounds are added to the material
to be tagged. However isotopic taggants also introduce specific isotopes of atoms at some
of the sites in the chemical compound to encode information [2]. The third type of
identification taggant that was named was biological taggants. These taggants used some
biologically produced chemicals as a chemical taggant such as DNA or used conventional
chemical taggants that were detected using biologically derived detection methods such as
immunoassays [2].
Particulate or physical taggants continued to be the most fully studied identification
taggant due to the 18 years of required use in Switzerland [2]. The Swiss experience with
physical taggants has shown that they can be recovered and that when recovered, they can
increase the rate at which crimes are solved [2]. Different types of physical taggants have
the potential to sensitize some or all explosives, due to the “gritty” nature of small particles.
The added particles may create areas with higher than usual friction, which could sensitize
or cause detonation of the explosive [2]. Additionally, physical identification taggants that
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can be used in explosives must be durable and unreactive in order to survive the detonation
process.

This means, however, that they are likely to survive in the environment

indefinitely and thus present a contamination risk both in the environment and any raw
materials produced via the use of explosives such as mining or quarrying [2].
Almost simultaneously with the publication of Taggants in Explosives, the country
of Switzerland enacted a federal statute that required taggants to be added to explosives
[2]. This legislation was enacted as a result of an increase in bombings that occurred during
the late 1970s [2]. This statute requires that all explosives (dynamites, slurries, water gels,
ammonium nitrate/fuel oil (ANFO), black powder) manufactured for consumption in the
Swiss market must have a unique taggant per manufacturer that is changed twice a year
[2], and a sample of the taggant is maintained by the Swiss federal government. Three
taggants are approved: the Microtaggant® a commercially produced version of the 3M
taggant tested in Taggants for Explosives; HF6, which is a Swiss developed version of the
Microtaggant®; and one called “…Explotracer that consists of orange polyethylene chunks
permeated with fluorescent markers, embedded iron particles, and rare-earth oxides” [2].
According to Swiss authorities, the addition of identification taggants into
explosives has helped law enforcement track explosives that were used, or attempted to be
used, in terrorist or criminal acts [2]. In Switzerland, 254 incidents where explosives, were
used in either improvised explosive devices or safecracking, occurred between 1984 and
1994. Of these, 44.4% were successfully solved when taggants were recovered in 63 cases.
Of the remaining 191 cases where taggants were not recovered, only 16.2% were solved
[2]. Therefore, the Swiss experience shows that when identification taggants are used and
recovered, the case is twice as likely to be solved under their taggant program [2].

30
Isotopic taggants were also evaluated, although limited experience and testing
meant that such evaluations were mostly preliminary. The compatibility of isotopic
taggants was judged to likely be acceptable since the proposed methods used parts per
million of the additives. Explosives manufacturing processes of the time did not require
this level of control, so it was deemed unlikely that the addition of such a low concentration
of another material would materially affect the properties [2]. Incomplete testing prevented
a full assessment of the survivability and recoverability of isotopic taggants in post-blast
residue, as only small-scale tests had been performed [2]. Due to their low concentrations
and the necessity of identifying the different isotopes used, analysis requires more
specialized equipment and techniques such as mass spectroscopy, which reduces the
number of facilities capable of performing the analysis [2, 4, 5]. The low concentrations
of the isotopic taggants were thought to significantly reduce the chances of environmental
risks or cause many issues with contamination of mined raw materials by the taggants,
although not enough data was available at the time to fully assess their impact [2]. The
cost of isotopic taggants is relatively high, though the low concentrations required make
them useful on an overall cost basis [2, 4].
Biological taggants were also limited by the same lack of experience and testing
that had hampered isotopic taggants. The compatibility of a biological taggant was hard to
assess given the preliminary nature of the research, though it is generally expected that low
concentrations would lower the risk of incompatibility [2].

The survivability and

recoverability of biologically based chemicals are uncertain due to the heat generated by
detonation and the harsh environment present during the manufacturing of some types of
explosives. An example of a harsh environment for biologically derived materials or
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chemicals is the manufacture of ammonium nitrate prills, which takes place at high
temperatures (145 to 155 ºC) and is strongly oxidizing as well [2]. A full evaluation of
environmental acceptability and contamination of mined raw materials was not available
at the time, but it was thought that the relatively low concentrations required would
minimize the risk of biological taggants having a negative effect on these criteria. The cost
of biological taggants depends on the production cost of the biological components. While
not fully developed, it is expected that the low concentrations required would result in an
acceptable cost for the benefits provided [2].
This extensive report was commissioned as a direct reaction to a terrorist attack on
the Alfred P. Murrah Building that used explosives. At the time of publication in 1998,
Marking and Rendering Inert evaluated a comprehensive identification taggant program as
too expensive for the current bombing risk environment. It proposed further investigation
into identification taggants so that in the event that the risk of bombings increased, at least
one type of identification taggant would be evaluated and the costs and benefits of such a
program could be evaluated again [2]. An additional conclusion of the report was that
based on the Swiss experience with identification taggants, a taggant program has been
shown to aid in solving crimes such as bombings [2].
The Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 caused Congress to reconsider a requirement
to use identification taggants in explosives. As a component of the 1996 Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act, the second report on the feasibility of using identification
taggants in explosives was commissioned and published in 1998 [2]. In the 18 years since
the OTA report, three major developments in explosives tagging had occurred. The first
was the passage in July of 1980, of the Swiss act requiring all explosives manufactured for
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the Swiss market to utilize an identification taggant program. The second development
was that despite an appropriations committee ban on the ATF investigating identification
taggants, additional identification taggant concepts had been invented based on the new
technologies that became available between the mid-1970s and the late 1990s [2]. The
final development was the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Convention on
Plastic Explosives from 1991 that required all signatories to adopt detection taggants in
certain plastic explosives by the end of 1996. The 1998 report mostly reiterated the results
of the 1980 OTA report: using identification taggants was technically feasible, but the cost
of the taggant program and concerns for safety still needed to be addressed [1, 2]. An
additional consideration from this new report was that many of the proposed taggant
methods were underdeveloped and required live testing before they could be fully
evaluated [2]. Table 2.3 summarizes the developments that occurred between 1981 and
1999.

Table 2.3. Summary of Events and Reactions between 1981 and 1999
Event
Appropriations Ban
(1981-1993)
Bombing of Alfred P.
Murrah Building (1995)
Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty
Act (1996)
Marking and Rendering
Inert (1998)

•
•
•
•
•
•

Reaction
ATF not permitted to research taggants
Passage of Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act
Commissioned Marking and Rendering Inert
Provided updated evaluation criteria for
identification taggants
Summarized status of research performed between
1980 and publication (approximately 1998)
Emphasized importance of cost, compatibility, and
survivability as the major evaluation areas
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Modern taggants (2000- present). The deadliest terrorist attack ever in
the United States occurred on September 11, 2001 with the attack on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon buildings. This prompted the passage of several laws, including
the Safe Explosive Act of 2002, which was part of Public Law 107-296, a larger bill that
created the Department of Homeland Security [16]. The major component of this act was
to restrict the unlicensed handling of explosives further than the Organized Crime Control
Act with the introduction of additional sitipulations for authorized users of explosives. As
concerns over terrorism continued, research into identification taggants has continued as
well. Most new technologies such as nanotechnology or DNA sequencing have been
proposed as potential identification taggant methods. Older methods have also been
adapted.
The Safe Explosives Act was passed as part of a larger bill that reorganized
components of the federal government. The explosives components of the law included
the most significant changes to explosive licenses and eligibility since the passage of the
1941 Federal Explosives Act. Under this new law, all purchasers and users of explosives
must hold a license or permit, whereas previously only purchasers or users of explosives
across state lines were required to hold a license or permit [17]. Additional changes were
made to categories of people prohibited from handling explosives [17].
Research into taggants has continued to the modern day [4, 5, 18, 19], though
available testing information and data remain scarce [5].

No new categories of

identification taggants have been identified; however, improvements and refinements to
the categories of physical, chemical, and biological taggants have occurred. Physical
taggants remain an active area of research [4, 5, 18, 20, 21]. One type of physical taggants
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that have been proposed are particles containing quantum dots that emit light at specific
frequencies, and the combination of frequencies can be used to encode information [4, 5].
Physical taggants where rare earths or other fluorescent materials such as dyes are
introduced to a carrier particle have been developed as well [4, 5, 18, 19]. These particles
encode information in the colors and intensities of the light they emit [4, 5, 18]. These
approaches are similar to the first taggants, which use different concentrations of various
elements contained within a particle [22, 23] but exploit the fluorescence of the dyes or
rare earths to also increase recoverability of the particles [5, 18]. Unique codes based on a
sequence of nucleotides can encode information that would be needed for an identification
taggant.
Due to the rapid development in the area of biology, DNA based identification
taggants continue to be proposed and developed [2, 4, 5]. Only low concentrations of
taggant are needed due to the amplification that can be obtained using polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) techniques [4, 5]. DNA sequences have been used commercially to tag
pharmaceutical products like cancer drugs [4] as well as other anti-counterfeiting uses [5].
DNA sequences can theoretically be of any length, which allows for a practically unlimited
number of codes [4, 5]. Reading these sequences using a technique such as PCR is well
understood, but the reagents, equipment, and expertise needed are a significant cost [4, 5].
Additionally, the stability of a DNA sequence when subjected to the heat created by
detonation is unknown and might preclude the use of DNA based identification taggants
with explosives [2].
Small ceramic or metal oxide particles that contain fluorescent rare earth materials
have been proposed as a taggant that can be used to identify if a particular type of material
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has been used [19, 20, 21]. The combination of rare earths used and the intensity of the
fluorescence can create a way of encoding information [4, 5, 20]. These particles can be
recovered in the field using a UV lamp [21]. Analysis of the particle requires the use of
sophisticated laboratory equipment and is correspondingly expensive [20, 21].
Similar glass particles have also been proposed as an identification taggant, where
the concentration of the different fluorescent rare earth elements is used to encode
information, unfortunately large charges that might be used in mining or other legal uses
(>500 lbs.) do not allow the glass microspheres to survive detonation [18, 19]. The taggant
elements can be added to the liquid glass, thus allowing for an even distribution of the
elements that make up the identification taggant in the final particle [18, 19]. Small
spherical glass particles, called microspheres, are already used in commercially produced
explosives [18]. This identification taggant changes the composition of the microspheres
that are added [18, 19]. As with other physical taggants such as the Microtaggant®,
recovery of the taggant is the major concern [2, 19]. Tests were performed to judge the
recoverability of these microsphere taggants, and showed mixed results for recoverability
and survivability of this taggant, where the taggant could be recovered for small charges,
but not for larger charges, and not in all cases [18, 19].
Recent taggant developments utilizing DNA or nanoparticles have occurred
because of the increased interest in technologies that counteract terrorism. This is a notable
change from previous cycles in the United States where government efforts lead to research
in identification taggants.

The shift in priority from crime to terrorism and the use of

explosives in asymmetric warfare has caused the development of identification taggants to
shift its priorities as well. Current technologies are suited for commercially manufactured
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explosives but are of limited use for homemade explosive materials.

The modern

experience shows that a universal identification taggant that can be used effectively in
identifying both commercially manufactured explosives and also homemade ones will be
necessary for an effective identification taggant program.
An older technique, neutron activation analysis, has become more capable with
modern computing power, software, and semiconductor manufacturing technology. This
technique can be used on samples regardless of their physical state and is thus well suited
to analyzing post-blast residue to find chemical taggants. Table 2.4 summarizes the events
between 2000 and their reactions.

Table 2.4. Summary of Events and Reactions between 2000 and the Current Day
Event
September 11th Terrorist
Attacks (2001)
US involvement in
conflicts in the Middle
East (2003-current)

•
•
•

Reaction
Passage of Safe Explosives Act of 2002
Creation of Department of Homeland Security
Renewed interest in identification taggants for
antiterrorism

2.1.3. Summary of Taggants Literature. Throughout the one hundred years of
taggant development, the same cycle has repeated several times. The cycle begins with a
triggering event such as a terrorist attack involving explosives or a major war. This event
prompts the government to consider changes to law or regulations that would provide more
identifying information about the explosives.

During the drafting of these laws or

regulations, studies are performed into mechanisms that can provide the type of
information desired, such as identification taggants. The proposed mechanisms are then
evaluated, and laws and regulations are finalized or ultimately rejected.

Additional
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mechanisms are proposed and investigated, and the cycle begins again when the next
triggering event occurs.
The implementation of a modern identification taggant would quickly provide
useful information for criminal forensic investigations and aid in investigations of terrorist
attacks involving explosives. Studies conducted in 1980 and 1998 have both shown that
while technology existed that could be used as an identification taggant, the cost of a
program and safety concerns were issues that would need to be resolved prior to
implementation. Additionally, any identification taggant must be rigorously tested before
being utilized. The 1998 report Marking and Rendering Inert identified other promising
candidates, but concluded that the lack of full-scale testing meant that a more thorough
evaluation would be needed.
The effectiveness of the different taggant technologies in meeting the identified
evaluation criteria is described qualitatively with a score on a scale from one to five based
on prior studies of taggants. A score of five means the taggant technology performs
extremely well in that category, and a score of one meaning the opposite. Cost is also
ranked on the same one to five scale, but with higher scores corresponding to lower taggant
cost and cheaper analysis costs. Therefore, the most effective taggant technologies will
have the highest total score. A comparison of the different identification taggant
technologies is shown in Table 2.5.
By total score, biological taggants are in last place due to concerns with
recoverability and survivability of the taggant as well as the relatively high cost of taggants,
and analysis of any recovered taggants [2]. Isotopic taggants meet all the criteria except
for the high cost of production [2]. Chemical taggants are tied with isotopic, due to some
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Table 2.5. Comparison of Identification Taggant Categories
Taggant
Radiologica
l [1]
Chemical
[2, 1]
Physical (or
Particulate)
[2, 1]
Isotopic [2]
Biological
[2]

Recoverability

Survivability

Utility

Compatibility
with
Explosives

Cost

Total
Score

5

5

3

5

4

22

3

3

5

4

3

21

5

5

4

4

4

22

5

5

5

5

1

21

3

3

5

5

2
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concerns over their recoverability and survivability [2]. Radiological taggants are tied for
the highest score, with concerns over the total number of potential codes, as well as their
cost [1]. Physical or particulate taggants share first place with radiological taggants. Due
to the low cost of physical or particulate taggants that also meeting most of the other
criteria, research focus has focused on producing a cheap physical taggant that is
compatible with explosives [1, 2].

2.2. NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS LITERATURE REVIEW
Several methods are capable of determining the composition of a chemical
identification taggant. An ideal method for use with chemical taggants for explosives must
be able to detect concentrations with ppb precision to enable extremely low taggant
concentrations to be used, be used with minimal sample processing to reduce losses of
recovered taggant, and be able to determine the composition of the bulk material to measure
the concentration of the taggant in undetonated explosives [1]. Mass spectroscopy is a
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commonly used method to determine composition. Many forms of mass spectroscopy have
the requisite precision, but require significant processing of the material to create the ions
that are analyzed and can only work on extremely small samples of material which
precludes most samples of undetonated explosives [24].

An alternative to mass

spectroscopy would be a technique such as inductively coupled plasma optical emission
spectroscopy (ICP-OES or ICP-AES). This technique introduces small quantities of a
liquid sample into a high temperature plasma and measures the photons emitted as the
sample atoms become ionized.

While highly precise, this technique also requires

processing that would result in loses of recovered taggant material [25]. NAA is a
technique that matches the ideal method: it has the requisite precision to measure
concentrations down to the ppb level, it requires no additional processing of samples, and
it measures the composition of the bulk sample [7]. As a result of these advantages, NAA
was the chosen analytical technique used for all analysis and is discussed further in the
following sections.
2.2.1. Overview of NAA. In its most basic form, NAA is a simple technique
where a specimen of interest is exposed to a large neutron flux for a period of time. While
exposed to the neutron flux, the nuclei of the atoms making up the sample will be struck
by neutrons and on occasion absorb them and convert from one isotope to a different one
with an additional neutron. These isotopes may later decay and produce characteristic
gamma rays while doing so. Using a specialized detector, the energy of the released
gamma rays can be measured, allowing the isotope to be identified [26]. A schematic
diagram of the process is shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2. Schematic Diagram of Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA)

To calculate the NAA spectrum from a sample, it is necessary to consider all the isotopes
of all the elements present in the sample. Fortunately, many of the common, low Z (low
atomic number) elements like O, N, etc. have very low capture cross sections and do not
contribute to the resulting spectrum to any real extent [27]. Many heavier elements, and
some of the taggant elements of interest have multiple stable isotopes that are present in
appreciable amounts in nature and convert to active nuclei, which can be detected by NAA.
Therefore, it is necessary to track the conversion of each isotope of each of the taggant
elements to determine what they convert to, and determine if that resulting, transmuted
isotope is active and can be identified with NAA.
With the set of taggant elements chosen for the nuclear barcode, there are 23
naturally occurring isotopes that are present in less than 0.9% concentration [27]. They are
organized in Table 2.6 into two columns: the first column contains isotopes that convert
into active nuclei that can be detected by NAA [27], and the second column contains
isotopes that convert into stable nuclei that cannot be detected by NAA [27]. The 17
isotopes in column 1 are ideal isotopes to detect using NAA. They have widely varying
half-lives [27], which gives them each widely varying activities for a given irradiation time.
Modern NAA detectors can be run in multi-channel mode where they count the
number of gamma rays that fall within a specific energy range as one channel and can
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Table 2.6. Active and Stable Taggant Nuclei under NAA

Eu-151
Lu-176
Ir-191

Column 1: Active Transmuted Nuclei
Eu-153 Dy-159 Dy-164 Ho-165 Lu-175
Sm-144 Sm-147 Sm-150 Sm-152 Sm-154
Ir-193
Re-185 Re-187 Rh-103

Column 2: Stable Nuclei
Dy-160
Dy-161
Dy-162
Dy-163
Sm-148
Sm-149

output the counts of all of the channels. Each active isotope has a characteristic gamma
spectrum that it emits as it decays. Therefore, each active isotope will give a peak on the
channel(s) that are closest in energy to their characteristic gamma rays [7]. This allows the
experimenter to identify which elements are present, as long as they can emit enough of a
signal to not be lost in background noise. A good spectrum will resemble the results in
Figure 2.3.
The spike at about 662 keV is the signal from 60Co, and is immediately apparent on
the graph. The green line at the top of the peak is the cursor used by the display program,
and is not of any analytical significance. A bad spectrum where the noise overwhelms the
signal will lack any distinct peaks, as in Figure 2.3 between about 50 keV and 300 keV.
Since the nuclear barcode uses such low concentrations of taggants, multi-channel NAA
experiments can only be used when the background will not overwhelm the signal. When
these difficulties are overcome, the taggant elements can be identified very easily, as each
element has a distinct spectrum, and can be readily identified by the peaks present on the
plot.
2.2.2. Mathematical Analysis. With the software support available, even very
faint peaks can be identified. However, this sensitivity can also cause problems in some
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Figure 2.3. Example Multi-Channel NAA Plot (60Co and 137Cs calibration sample)

instances where “peaks” are identified that are not actually present in the sample. One
criterion used to determine if a give peak is a real peak, or if it is statistical noise, is the
ratio of the uncertainty in the net area under the peak and the net area under the peak itself
(the number of counts for that particular peak). If the uncertainty in the net number of
counts is less than the number of counts under a particular peak, then that peak is classified
as real. In the opposite case, the peak is classified as noise, and not an actual peak.
NAA can also be used quantitatively [7]. When each active isotope emits its own
characteristic gamma spectrum while irradiated, the detector identifies the energy of the
emitted gamma ray and counts them. However, even the best gamma ray detectors can
only keep track of a limited number of different energy bins. As a result, an active isotope’s
peak is broadened into something resembling a bell curve. Integrating the number of
counts under the broadened peak gives the total activity associated with the active isotope
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responsible for that peak. This allows the amount of the active isotopes to individually be
calculated, and thus give the concentrations associated with the nuclear barcode [7].
The usefulness of NAA is governed by the activity of the irradiated sample. The
activity of any material is governed by Equation 1:

𝐴" = 𝜆𝑁&'()*,"

(1)

where 𝐴 is the activity of the sample from isotope 𝑖 , 𝜆 is the decay constant of the
transmuted isotope, and 𝑁&'()*," is the number of atoms of the specific isotope 𝑖.
The number of transmuted atoms of isotope 𝑖 can be calculated from the number of atoms
of isotope 𝑖 − 1 in Equation 2:

𝑁&'()*," = 𝑁"/0 𝜎"/0 𝜙𝑡

(2)

where 𝑁&'()*," is the number of transmuted atoms of isotope 𝑖; 𝑁"/0 is the number of atoms
of isotope 𝑖 − 1; 𝜎"/0 is the neutron capture cross section of isotope 𝑖 − 1; 𝜙 is the neutron
flux; and 𝑡 is the irradiation time of the sample. Equation 2 provides the way to calculate
the number of atoms that capture a neutron from the incident flux, which converts it from
one isotope to another. Since both the flux 𝜙 and the neutron capture cross section 𝜎5,"/0
are functions of the energy of the incident neutrons, the one group approximation will be
used where these quantities are averaged to a single number [28].
The calculations carried out in Equations 1 and 2 describe the capture of one
neutron from the flux by an isotope 𝑖. In general, for normal neutron fluxes and irradiation
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times, a nucleus will capture only one neutron, so there is no need to track transmutation
from 𝑖 − 2 to 𝑖 − 1 for example. As such, any of these secondary conversions can be
ignored, as they are extremely unlikely to occur. For the remaining analysis, the effects of
these additional reactions will be ignored, and it will be assumed that the only reaction
possible is the capture of a single neutron, after which the activated nucleus will simply
decay.
The measured activity of a radioactive sample comes from the decay of the nuclei,
which decay at a constant rate given by 𝜆. Combining this information allows the quantity
of an element to be identified by NAA using Equation 3 [7].

𝑚=𝐶

𝜆
((1 −

𝑒 /;&< )𝑒 /;&> (1

−

𝑒 /;&? )

∗

𝑀(
𝛷&C 𝜎DEF 𝛤𝜀𝜃𝑁J

(3)

where 𝑚 is the mass of the mass of the element, 𝐶 is the net counts under the peak, 𝑡" is
the time the sample was irradiated for, 𝑡K is the time between the irradiation of the sample
and beginning to count the sample, 𝑡L is the duration of the measurement, 𝑀( is the atomic
mass of the element, 𝛷&C is the one group approximation of the flux the sample was
exposed to, 𝜎DFF is the one group approximation of the neutron capture cross section, 𝛤 is
the probability of a gamma photon being emitted by a decay event, 𝜀 is the probability that
an emitted photon will trigger a count in the detector, 𝜃 is the isotopic abundance of the
target isotope, and 𝑁J is Avogadro’s number. Since all of these quantities can be found in
reference materials, or are experimentally determined, the mass of the elements can be
calculated.
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The uncertainty in the measured mass of the element can also be determined [7].
The uncertainty in the calculated mass, 𝑢L , of the element can be calculated by summing
the product of the derivative of equation 3 with respect to each variable by the uncertainty
in the value of each variable in equation 3 in quadrature. This is shown in equation 4.

𝑢L N = O PQ
"

𝜕𝑚 N
T ∗ 𝑢" N U
𝜕𝑥"

(4)

2.2.3. Uses of NAA. NAA is particularly well suited for determining the
composition of materials that are a) hard to dissolve into solution, b) easy to contaminate
while trying to dissolve them, c) are unique and should not be destroyed or dissolved, or
d) have a surface composition different from the bulk [7]. Many diverse disciplines and
experiments can make use of this technique, including archeology [26] and semiconductor
manufacturing [7].
NAA has been used in many fields since its invention to identify the composition
of materials. In archeology, it has been used to investigate so called “trace” and “ultratrace” elements present in clays used to make ceramics. These “trace” elements are present
at parts per million level and “ultra-trace” at the parts per billion levels [29], which is the
range of concentrations that the nuclear barcode uses. In fact, archeology uses these
elements to identify what some researchers call a “fingerprint” of the clay, since these
elements, present at such low concentrations, are incredibly unlikely to be added to the
clay. The use of these “fingerprints” allows archeologists to identify the origin of the clay
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used in ceramics, which can reveal trade routes and contact between different groups if the
clay is from a significant distance from where the ceramics were discovered [29].
Semiconductor manufacturing requires extremely pure materials, as any impurities
can affect the electrical properties of the resulting device. In the manufacture of gallium
arsenide (GaAs) based semiconductors, one important impurity is zinc (Zn), which acts as
an electron acceptor and as such alters the electrical properties of the material [30]. Due
to the sensitivity of GaAs based semiconductors to Zn impurities, accurately measuring the
Zn concentration down to parts per billion level is crucial [30]. NAA and its derivatives
are used to determine the concentration due to the accuracy and precision that is only
possible with NAA, and not comparable techniques [30].
2.2.4. Summary of NAA. NAA is an analytical technique that is well suited for
use in identifying a taggant in post-blast residue. The technique has strong theoretical
underpinnings that allow for detailed analysis of the composition of the material.
Additionally, the technique of NAA is well understood and an expression for the total
uncertainty in the measurement of the composition of the material can be developed. NAA
can be used on any sample regardless of the physical form, and is capable of probing not
just the surface composition of the material, but providing measurements of the bulk.
These advantages have been realized in fields such as the semiconductor industry when
analyzing contaminant concentrations in wafers down to parts per billion [30].
Additionally, NAA is a nondestructive technique and this advantage has been used to great
effect in archeology to identify the origins of ceramics by matching their compositions to
clays [29]. These characteristics make NAA a good candidate technique for identifying an
identification taggant in post-blast residue.
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2.3. EXPLOSIVES LITERATURE REVIEW
An explosive is a material that undergoes a reaction known as detonation.
Detonation produces a shockwave trailed by an extremely exothermic chemical reaction.
Knowing the composition of the explosive allows the products of the reaction that occurs
during detonation to be predicted.

Parameters such as the detonation velocity and

detonation pressure that describe the performance of the explosive can be predicted based
on this knowledge of the detonation products as well [31].
2.3.1. Explosives Chemistry. Explosives react in an oxidation reaction, similar to
the burning of a fuel. During this reaction, different elements are “burned” with the oxygen
present in the explosive to produce highly oxidized products such as CO2 or H2O that
maximize the sharing of electrons between atoms, since this produces the most
thermodynamically stable products. Most explosives currently used are composed of four
elements: carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, which can be written as CxHyNwOz. It
is generally assumed that the reaction occurs in two steps: first the explosive molecule
separates into individual atoms due to the heat and energy, second the individual atoms
react to form molecules and release energy that sustains the explosion. Additionally, there
is a hierarchy or ordering in which the products are produced: first, nitrogen atoms combine
to make nitrogen gas, second hydrogen and oxygen react to form water vapor, third carbon
and oxygen react to form carbon monoxide, fourth carbon monoxide and oxygen react to
form carbon dioxide, and fifth any remaining oxygen atoms react to form oxygen gas.
While the exact mechanism by which this system of reactions occurs is unknown, the
ordering of these reactions is a good “rule of thumb”. If the explosive molecule has too
little oxygen, then the reactions will stop when all of the oxygen is consumed, since this
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series of reactions occurs much faster than the products could mix with air from the
environment [31].
Explosives that contain too little oxygen to fully convert carbon into carbon dioxide
are called under oxidized explosives, explosives that produce oxygen gas are called
overoxidized explosives, and explosives that fully convert carbon into carbon dioxide but
do not produce any excess oxygen gas are called oxygen balanced explosives [31]. If an
explosive is under oxidized, then incomplete reaction of carbon can occur, which produces
solid carbon. This solid carbon is then dispersed throughout the environment and deposited
on surfaces from which it can be recovered as post-blast residue. In real detonations, it is
common to have pockets of overoxidation and under oxidation, so real detonations almost
always produce post-blast residues. Additional post-blast residue can be produced by small
particles of the undetonated explosive that do not detonate [32]. Figure 2.4 shows postblast residue from a binary explosive that condensed onto a steel cylinder and was collected
onto a cotton ball.
2.3.2. Explosive Characterization. Explosives can be characterized based on
their reaction mechanism or their sensitivity. Detonation is a process where the explosive
material reacts and produces a shockwave with a velocity higher than the speed of sound
in the material that contains the reaction zone. Explosives that undergo detonation are
called high explosives, and include materials such as trinitrotoluene (TNT) or
nitroglycerine [31]. Low explosives do not produce a shock wave with a velocity that
exceeds the speed of sound in the material and therefore do not undergo detonation. Instead
low explosives undergo deflagration, where the reaction zone moves through the material
slower than the speed of sound [31]. A common low explosive is black powder.
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Figure 2.4. Post-blast Residue from Binary Explosive Collected onto a Cotton Ball

Explosives are also characterized by their sensitivity to stimuli such as friction or
impact. The most sensitive explosives are referred to as primary explosives. Primary
explosives require minimal stimulus to detonate. This characteristic makes them well
suited for the use as initiators such as a blasting cap. Secondary explosives are less
sensitive than primary explosives but produce more energy per unit mass than primary
explosives. Most can be detonated with a blasting cap. This category contains common
commercial and military explosives such as TNT and nitroglycerine. Tertiary explosives
are less sensitive than secondary explosives, and typically require a relatively large quantity
of secondary explosive be detonated in order for tertiary explosives to detonate. The most
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common example of a tertiary explosive is a mixture of ammonium nitrate with mass fuel
oil (ANFO), which requires a booster charge composed of a secondary explosive when
used in commercial blasting.
2.3.3. Explosive Performance. The explosive performance is dependent on
several factors including the explosive used, the density of the explosive, and the degree of
confinement of the explosive. Each explosive has a characteristic detonation velocity,
which is the rate at which the reaction zone moves through the explosive at the maximum
density of the explosive that permits detonation. In most explosives, if an explosive is too
dense from being packed too tightly, detonation cannot sustain itself, and the explosive will
not detonate [31]. The detonation velocity at densities other than the maximum density is
typically linear and can be estimated. The detonation pressure produced by an explosive
is the product of the explosive density and the square of the detonation velocity divided by
the ratio of specific heats of the detonation product gases plus one [31]. The detonation
velocity and detonation pressure are measures of the power of an explosive. The brisance
or shattering strength of an explosive is also related to the detonation velocity [33].
The detonation of explosives destroys containers and produces fragments. The
distance these fragments travel can be estimated by several methods. The most basic is
through quantity-distance (QD), which takes the quantity of explosive and the distance
from the explosive into account, and states that for a given quantity of explosives buildings,
roads, etc. must be located beyond a certain distance [34]. In general, the further away
from the explosive the fewer fragments. QD methods often assume that anything within
the distance is unsafe and anywhere outside of this radius is perfectly safe, even if it is one
inch beyond this distance [34]. Modeling such as IMESAFR includes more factors than
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just the quantity and distance by introducing simulations of the fragment dispersion [35].
These simulations produce probabilistic assessments of damage or injury at different
distances based on the quantity and type of explosive [35, 34]. At the lab scale, it is
possible to approximate the fragment production and distribution. The Gurney equation is
used to determine the initial velocity of a fragment, the Mott equation to determine the
number of fragments below a certain mass, and ballistics to determine the trajectory and
time of flight of these fragments [31].
2.3.4. Summary of Explosives. When a material explodes, it produces large
quantities of gaseous products and large amounts of energy. If the explosive, or part of the
explosive, is under oxidized, then the detonation process will not result in the complete
oxidation of carbon. This carbon can then be deposited on surfaces and collected as postblast residue. Depending on the performance of the explosive, materials near it may be
fragmented and scattered about. These fragments may contain traces of post-blast residue
that can be sampled to collect an identification taggant, and their locations can be predicted
by simulation or approximation.

52
3. NUCLEAR BARCODE CONCEPT

The taggant developments described in Section 2.1 have prompted the creation of
a new identification taggant, the Nuclear Barcode, that is proposed to satisfy the key
characteristics of a successful identification taggant better than previously developed
taggants. The nuclear barcode focuses on allowing identification taggant to survive the
detonation process intact, prevent counterfeiting or obscuration, as well as providing a
sufficiently large number of potential codes to enable labeling individual batches of
product. The nuclear barcode is designed to accomplish these goals inexpensively while
also not affecting the properties or sensitivity of the tagged explosive.

3.1. NUCLEAR BARCODE CONCEPT DESCRIPTION
The nuclear barcode is a proposed identification taggant. It falls between a physical
taggant and a chemical taggant that uses the combination of concentrations of rare earth
and other elements to encode information. This provides a large number of possible codes.
The present design of the nuclear barcode would use 40 different concentrations of eight
elements, giving a total of 408 or 6.56 trillion unique combinations. This number can be
increased further by using a larger number of elements or by using a larger number of
concentration levels.

The number of codes allows for a relatively large amount of

information to be included in the codes such as the type of explosive, manufacturer, and
enable identifying individual batches of the explosive products. This capability would
represent a notable improvement compared to the system mandated in Switzerland [2]. A
schematic of the Nuclear Barcode is shown in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1. Nuclear Barcode Schematic

Additionally, recovery of the nuclear barcode taggant is simple, requiring only a
sample of the post-blast residue that can be recovered with minimal training. Unlike most
chemical taggants, the exact chemicals that are added to the explosive do not influence the
recoverability or survivability of the taggant, as long as the elements are added in the
correct concentrations. The nuclear barcode uses neutron activation analysis (NAA) to
identify the concentration levels, which identifies the elements present in a sample by their
nuclei and not their chemistry.
The elements used to create the nuclear barcode taggant are relatively expensive,
being rare earth elements or precious metals, but they only need to be added in small
concentrations (ppb to a few ppm). The use of NAA allows for the higher cost taggant
elements to be used in concentrations down to 100 parts per billion (ppb), thus decreasing
the cost of the taggant materials. This represents a tradeoff that reduces the cost of the
taggant materials but increases the cost of the analysis, however, this tradeoff is
economically favorable overall. Preliminary studies have been performed using the rare
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earth elements holmium (Ho), samarium (Sm), and europium (Eu) [36]. These elements
were introduced into explosives as sulfates, and the most expensive of these materials cost
approximately $15 per gram. At the average concentration of 1 ppm, this would be a
sufficient quantity to tag one metric ton of explosives, and add about 1.5¢ per kilogram of
explosives in material costs. This low material cost enables the tagging of any explosive
material and may be suitable for use with some explosive precursors used in improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) as well. A schematic illustrating the use of the nuclear barcode is
shown in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2. Creating (a), Using (b), and Reading the Nuclear Barcode (c) in an
Explosive
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As a taggant that is introduced at low concentrations, the effect of the nuclear
barcode on the reactivity of energetic materials is minimal. Concentrations of components
in manufacturing of explosives are not controlled with ppm tolerances, and the addition of
these materials will not pose any problems to long-term stability either. Additionally, since
the nuclear barcode taggant relies on the elements present and not on physical particles,
there is no additional material that might be rough and cause increased sensitivity.
Preliminary testing has shown no notable reactivity of two types of explosives with the rare
earth elements holmium, samarium, and europium, although no long-term stability tests
have been performed. Charges of a commercial binary explosive as well as composition
B have been tagged with one or three rare earth elements at concentrations from 1 ppm to
14 ppm, with no apparent change in explosive properties.
The nuclear barcode provides solutions to the two largest issues raised in both the
1980 OTA report and the 1998 report: the cost of taggant and the potential for an
identification taggant to sensitize the explosive to which it was added. The quantity of the
higher cost taggant elements is controlled through the use of low concentrations, which is
enabled by NAA. Since NAA is used to analyze the low concentrations, the cost of
analyzing a sample will be high, since research reactors and neutron sources that can be
used for NAA are few in number. This higher cost can be minimized by analyzing fewer
samples; under ideal circumstances, only one sample would be required. Sensitization of
explosives is also controlled through the use of low concentrations of taggant elements.
The nuclear barcode also retains the advantages of modern identification taggants:
survivability of the taggant in the post-blast residue, and forensic utility of the taggant.
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These traits make the nuclear barcode a promising candidate as an identification taggant
for explosives.

3.2.

NUCLEAR BARCODE CONCEPT EVALUATION
The nuclear barcode taggant takes the higher compatibility with explosives from

chemical taggants and combines it with the other properties of a physical taggant to
produce a hybrid that performs better than previously developed taggant technologies. The
nuclear barcode accomplishes forensic goals while also being relatively cheap to
implement and having a minimal safety impact. Although the price of the materials used
to tag explosives using the nuclear barcode is high, the use of neutron activation analysis
for analyzing the results means the added cost from the taggant itself is low. Additionally,
the low concentrations used also ameliorate the safety concerns, as manufacturing of
explosives is not affected by concentrations at these low levels.
The survivability of the nuclear barcode must be established, since it enjoys a
relative advantage in comparison to other physical and chemical taggants other areas. If
the nuclear barcode proves survivable, then it would represent an improved taggant over
previously developed ones. Section 1.3 presents four research objectives that assess the
survivability of an identification taggant that are reproduced here:

1. Determine if the taggant elements can be detected and quantified via NAA at the
desired concentrations.
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2. Determine if the different concentration levels of the taggant elements can be
distinguished via NAA with sufficient precision that the measured concentration
lies within only one concentration level (50 ppb precision to use the Nuclear
Barcode as designed).

3. Determine the distinguishability of the taggant elements from background signals,
including other taggant elements and common elements in the environment such as
sodium, potassium, chlorine, etc.

4. Identify concentrations of the taggant elements in the post blast residues and verify
them to be the same as in the undetonated sample.

To test these objectives, a series of eight tests was developed. For each taggant
element, these tests must determine the lowest concentration of the taggant element that
can be measured, determine the survivability of the taggant element in post-blast residue,
determine the effect of the type of explosive on the survivability of the taggant element,
and determine the repeatability of measuring the concentration of the taggant element in
post-blast residue. All of these must be determined simultaneously when multiple elements
are included, and the different elements must not prevent one another from being measured.
These tests are further described in Section 4. A summary of these tests and the research
objectives they address are shown in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1. Summary of Tests Performed and Which Objectives they Address
Test Series
Single Element Standard Solutions
Single Element Binary Post-Blast
Single Element Composition B
Post-Blast
Multi-Element Standard Solutions
Multi-Element Binary Post-Blast
Multi-Element Composition B
Post-Blast
Multi-Element Binary
Repeatability
Multi-Element Composition B
Repeatability

Test Objective
Best case detectability of elements
at low concentration
Survivability of elements in postblast residue
Effect of explosive type on
survivability
Best case simultaneous
survivability of elements
Simultaneous survivability of
elements in post-blast residue
Effect of explosive type on
simultaneous survivability of
elements in post-blast residue
Repeatability of simultaneous
survivability of elements in postblast residue
Effect of explosive type on
repeatability of simultaneous
survivability of elements in postblast residue

Research
Objectives
1,2
3,4
3,4
1,2,3
1,3,4
1,3,4
1,2,3,4

1,2,3,4
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4. RESEARCH METHODS

The four research objectives stated in Section 1.3 led to the development of a series
of eight tests to address the issue of the survivability of the nuclear barcode. This section
describes the NAA procedure that was used to measure the samples from the eight test
series in Section 4.1. Sections 4.2 through 4.9 describe the procedures for each test series,
the objectives the test evaluates, and what a successful or unsuccessful test for each
objective would entail.

4.1. NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS USING MISSOURI S&T REACTOR
The sample preparation for each test is described in Sections 4.2 to 4.9. This
section describes the preparation of a sample for NAA, the process of NAA as performed
at the MSTR, and the process of counting a sample.
Samples are prepared before undergoing NAA to prevent the sample from breaking
in the pneumatic tube system that transfers samples to and from the core. Samples were
first placed in two small, one inch by two inch plastic bags. These plastic bags were then
placed in a 20 mm diameter by two inch long plastic vial that snaps closed at the top. Once
the vial is closed, any plastic that extends beyond the diameter of the vial is cut using
scissors. The top of the vial is then sealed using a heat gun to ensure that the vial remains
closed during transfers to and from the core. When a liquid sample was used, a small vial
approximately five mm by ½ inch long that contained 0.5 mL (for single element standard
solution tests) or 0.495 mL (for multi-element standard solution tests) of liquid was sealed
in the same manner as a larger vial.
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The pneumatic system that transfers the sealed samples to the core is called the
rabbit system, since it takes approximately one second to travel the full length. Outside of
the core, the sealed sample is loaded into a glove box that contains one end of the rabbit
system. The sealed sample is inserted into a tube, and when the system is pressurized,
transferred into a similar tube that is located in the reactor core. All irradiations used the
bare rabbit tube; where the sealed samples were transferred to a tube that was not shielded
by a sheet of cadmium, which exposed the samples to the thermal and fast flux produced
by the reactor. A cadmium shielded rabbit tube was also available. Cadmium shields
samples from thermal neutrons, so the only neutrons that would interact would have higher
energies. After ten minutes, the sealed sample was transferred from the tube in the reactor
core back to the tube in the glove box where it could be retrieved and the next sample could
be irradiated.
When a sample was measured, it was first removed from the sealed vial that carried
it through the rabbit system to the core. The sample was placed in a new plastic bag, and
was then placed on the end cap of one of two HPGe detectors. After the first detector failed
during measuring one sample of 500 ppb samarium solution, later samples used only the
second detector that did not fail. Canberra’s ProSpect software was used to control the
detector and to collect the data. All samples were counted for one hour of counting time.
This meant that longer than one hour of real time elapsed per sample due to the detector
phenomenon of deadtime. When a critical number of photons hit the detector, the detector
briefly loses the ability to measure any additional photons; the amount of time a detector
stays in this state is called deadtime since the detector is not doing any work. Deadtime is
usually expressed as a percent of the total time the detector was active, and deadtimes of
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5% were typically observed. Deadtime can be reduced either through less active samples
or better detectors, but cannot be completely eliminated.
After the data was collected for one hour of counting time, the resulting NAA
spectrum was analyzed. The spectrum was gone through manually to identify peaks or
potential peaks. The ProSpect software was used to match the shape of the peaks and
calculate the total area under the curve of the manually fitted peaks. Additionally, the
ProSpect software was used to estimate the net area (counts) under the peak and the
background counts under the peak. After manual fitting, the software’s built in peak search
routine was run with a sensitivity of 2 to identify any additional peaks.

In most

circumstances, this process “identified” additional peaks that were determined to be not
present after manually inspecting them, so the sensitivity settings were overly aggressive.
In almost all circumstances, the peak search routine identified the manually identified
peaks with good agreement with the shape of the peak, confirming that they were present.
The net number of counts from the best fit of manual or software peak search routine was
used as judged by the calculated gaussian ratio fit to the NAA spectrum. This number of
counts, along with the amount of real time the detector operated for, the length of the
irradiation time, and the delay time were then used to calculate the concentration of the
taggant elements in the sample using Equation 3.

4.2. SINGLE ELEMENT STANDARD SOLUTIONS
The first series of tests was performed on solutions of three representative elements:
holmium (Ho), samarium (Sm), and europium (Eu). The three elements were dissolved in
deionized (DI) water and made into five solutions, each of a different concentration of one
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taggant element. The five concentrations used were 100, 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 4,000 parts
per billion (ppb) on an atom basis, and measured using NAA. These concentrations cover
the proposed range for the nuclear barcode and extend to higher concentrations. These
solution tests were performed first to judge the effectiveness of the NAA parameters chosen
and the suitability of the candidate elements for analysis with NAA.
4.2.1. Determine if the Taggant Elements can be Detected and Quantified via
NAA at the Desired Concentration. This test series represents a best-case scenario for
detecting and determining the concentrations of these elements; the test samples contain
only the taggant element and DI water, which does not show up under these test conditions.
Using these samples, it is possible to determine the minimum concentration of these
taggant elements that can be detected using the MSTR and the detectors available there.
To meet this objective, it must be possible to accurate measure the concentration of the
taggant elements contained in the solutions. Any other result would mean the test fails to
meet this objective.
4.2.2. Determine if the Different Concentration Levels of the Taggant
Elements can be Distinguished and Quantified via NAA. The single element standard
Solutions also offer the best-case scenario for determining the uncertainty in calculating
the concentration of the taggant elements. The measurements of the uncertainty will
depend only on the limits of the technique of NAA itself and not on any other conditions.
This series of tests determines the minimum spacing between the concentration levels that
can be used with the nuclear barcode. For the nuclear barcode to work, the concentration
must be able to be put into one and only one of the concentration levels. Since the
concentration levels are separated by 100 ppb, the maximum uncertainty in the
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concentration should be half of that or 50 ppb to make sure that the concentration would
stay within one concentration level. This test meets this objective by having the uncertainty
in the concentration of the taggant element below 50 ppb.

4.3. MULTI-ELEMENT STANDARD SOLUTIONS
The multi-element standard solutions build on the single element standard solution
tests by adding an additional complicating factor. Instead of the samples containing only
one taggant element, samples were prepared that contained all three of the taggant elements
tested. Six total combinations of the three elements at three different concentrations (500
ppb, 1,000 ppb, and 2,000 ppb) were prepared, all of which are concentrations the nuclear
barcode was designed to use.
4.3.1. Determine if the Taggant Elements can be Detected and Quantified via
NAA at the Desired Concentration. The additional activity caused by the presence of
multiple of these elements produces additional noise in the measured NAA spectrum. This
noise reduces the prominence of the peaks that are detected. This objective is met if the
added noise in the NAA spectrum does not prevent accurately measuring the concentration
of the taggant elements in the prepared solutions.
4.3.2. Determine if the Different Concentration Levels of the Taggant
Elements can be Distinguished and Quantified via NAA. This series of tests allows for
the determination of the magnitude of this effect for combinations of these three elements.
The higher noise in the NAA spectrum mentioned in the previous objective should increase
the uncertainty in the calculated concentration of the taggant elements present. Otherwise,
this is still close to a best-case scenario for the detection of the taggant elements and
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measuring their concentrations. The concentration levels determined by this series of
experiments should be much more in line with what can be expected to be used for
undetonated explosives or for other materials, since the most common components in
explosives (carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen) also are not detectable using NAA
like the DI water used in these solutions. Similar to the single element standard solutions,
this test series requires that the concentrations of the different taggant elements be
simultaneously resolved to within 50 ppb to meet this objective.
4.3.3. Determine the Distinguishability of the Taggant Elements from
Background Signal, such as other Taggant Elements and Common Elements in the
Environment such as Sodium, Potassium, Chlorine, etc. The multi-element standard
solution test series directly tests the ability of NAA to differentiate between the different
taggant elements used. This is one component of this third objective addressing the
survivability of the nuclear barcode. In general, elements that are close in atomic number
and are chemically similar, like rare earth elements, are harder to separate using NAA than
elements that are not chemically similar. This test series directly evaluates if the three
taggant elements are able to be separated using NAA. The number of codes the nuclear
barcode can create is a function of the number of distinct elements used. Interference where
the presence of one element prevents the identification of a second element would reduce
this number and be detrimental to the nuclear barcode. This test meets this objective if
each element has at least one peak in the NAA spectrum that does not overlap with any
other peak.
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4.4. SINGLE ELEMENT BINARY POST-BLAST
The most basic test to determine the detectability of holmium and samarium in the
post-blast residue introduces these taggant elements into the undetonated explosives at
higher concentration than would be used in the finished nuclear barcode. The explosive
charges were a commercially manufactured, cap sensitive binary explosive: ammonium
nitrate and nitromethane, which separately will not detonate, but when combined will
detonate. The binary used has a maximum velocity of detonation (VOD) of 6,300 m/s [37].
Due to the difficulties first encountered when measuring out quantities of taggant
material on the small charges used in these experiments (160 grams for binary explosive
charges), larger concentrations than proposed for the nuclear barcode were added to the
charges in this initial demonstration. For the holmium tests, the binary charges were each
tagged with 0.00685 grams of holmium sulfate, giving a holmium mass concentration of
19,000 ppb to 20,000 ppb based on the manufacturing tolerances of the binary explosive.
Similar concentrations were used for the samarium binary tests, but used 0.00789 grams of
samarium sulfate per charge. Terrorist attacks would use significantly higher amounts of
explosive and produce a larger amount of post-blast residue. Once the tagging process is
scaled up to a commercial manufacturing level, the whole process would be scaled up and
the quantities of taggant materials for a typical batch of explosives would be easier to
measure.
Five charges were prepared: two were tagged with holmium, two with samarium,
and the fifth was untagged to provide a control. The tagged, undetonated explosive charges
were put in a steel cylinder to provide a surface from which post-blast residue could be
collected. A new steel cylinder was used for each test to eliminate cross-contamination
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between different tests. A steel cylinder acts as a stand in for a trashcan or a piece of debris
where post-blast residue from a real terrorist attack might be deposited. Figure 4.1 shows
the setup of the charge within the cylinder (Figure 4.1a) and the same cylinder after
detonation (Figure 4.1b).

Figure 4.1. Single Element Binary Post-Blast Test Showing the Charge Contained within
the Steel Cylinder. Denoted (a) and the Same Cylinder after Detonation, with Post-Blast
Residue Apparent at the Center (b). A Representative Sampling Path is Indicated by the
Dashed Circles in Figure 4.1a

The single element binary post-blast test series was chronologically the first test
series performed on post-blast residues. The testing methodology of all post-blast tests
was based on the method developed for this series. After the explosive was detonated, a
pre-weighed cotton ball was used to collect the post-blast residue. The cotton ball was
dabbed along the dotted lines shown in Figure 4.1a to collect post blast residue deposited
on the steel cylinder by the top, center, and bottom of the charge. After collecting the postblast residue, the cotton ball was weighed again. The quantity of post-blast residue that was
recovered is therefore the difference between the mass of the cotton ball before swabbing
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and after swabbing. Before detonation, a separate pre-weighed cotton ball was used to
sample the same path that was used post-blast to provide a control and determine if the
taggant elements were present in the steel cylinder itself. A third, clean, cotton ball was
used as an additional control to ensure that no taggant elements were present on the cotton
ball initially. Each post-blast test produced three samples: a cotton ball with post-blast
residue, a cotton ball without post-blast residue, and a clean cotton ball.
4.4.1. Determine the Distinguishability of the Taggant Elements from
Background Signal, such as other Taggant Elements and Common Elements in the
Environment such as Sodium, Potassium, Chlorine, etc. This series of tests establishes
a best-case scenario for detecting the taggant elements in the post-blast residue by using
concentrations higher than specified by the nuclear barcode.

This test series also

establishes if the individual taggant elements will encounter any interference from the other
elements present in the post blast residue. This test meets this objective if at least one peak
from the taggant element can be identified in the NAA spectrum of the post-blast residue.
4.4.2. Identify Concentrations of the Taggant Elements in the Post-Blast
Residues and Verify them to be the Same as in the Undetonated Sample. This series
of tests on holmium and samarium tagged explosives provides the simplest test for
identifying the taggant element in the post-blast residue, determining its concentration, and
comparing its composition to the undetonated explosive. Only one taggant element is
present in each explosive charge, so there should be no interferences from the other taggant
elements. Additionally, the binary explosive produces the largest quantity of post-blast
residue of the two types of explosive tested. Further enhancing the detectability of the
taggant element is that the concentrations used are higher than prescribed by the nuclear
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barcode. This test meets this objective if the measured concentration of the taggant element
in the post-blast residue is equal to the concentration of the taggant element in the
undetonated explosive.

4.5. SINGLE ELEMENT COMPOSITION B POST-BLAST
The explosives charges used in these tests were two 60 gram charges of cast
Composition B manufactured as a 50/50 mixture of TNT and RDX on site and tagged with
holmium. Composition B has a maximum VOD ranging from 7600 to 8000 m/s [31]. Two
tagged holmium charges were used to compare to the binary explosive charges tagged with
holmium. Larger concentrations than proposed for the nuclear barcode were added to the
charges in this initial demonstration, due to the relatively small size of the charges. For
these tests, 0.00170 grams of holmium sulfate was added giving a concentration of 2,000
ppb to 3,000 ppb for each charge. Unlike the binary post-blast series of tests, no charges
were tagged with samarium. This is because holmium is a monoisotopic element, which
simplifies detection in the post-blast residue.

Therefore, any differences in the

survivability of the taggant that are observed are due to the use of Composition B.
The single element Composition B post-blast series of tests adds an additional layer
of complexity to the single element binary post-blast test series due to the reduced quantity
of post-blast residue produced by Composition B. This is likely due to a combination of
factors such as Composition B’s higher velocity of detonation, and the binary explosive’s
requirement for even mixing for maximum performance which was not always practical to
achieve. While the lower quantity of post-blast residue means that a smaller quantity of
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other elements will be present in the sample, it also means that less of the taggant elements
will be present as well.
4.5.1. Determine the Distinguishability of the Taggant Elements from
Background Signal, such as other Taggant Elements and Common Elements in the
Environment such as Sodium, Potassium, Chlorine, etc. This test series is designed to
determine if the reduced amount of taggant elements in the post-blast residue make
identifying the taggant element harder than in the single element binary post-blast test
series. Like the single element binary post-blast test series, a real-world terrorist attack
would likely involve much larger quantities of explosives that would produce
correspondingly larger quantities of post-blast residue, so the reduced quantity of residue
produced by Composition B represent a low end estimate for the post-blast residue
recovered. Like the single element binary post-blast test series, this test meets the objective
if at least one peak from the taggant element can be identified in the NAA spectrum of the
post-blast residue.
4.5.2. Identify Concentrations of the Taggant Elements in the Post-Blast
Residues and Verify them to be the Same as in the Undetonated Sample. This series
of single element Composition B post-blast tests also attempts to directly answer this last
objective under worse conditions than the single element binary post-blast test series. The
reduced quantity of post-blast residue produced by the detonation of composition B also
reduces the amount of recovered taggant. This makes detecting the taggant element harder
and thus makes quantifying the concentration of the taggant element in the post-blast
residue more difficult than in the residue produced from the binary explosive. This test
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meets this objective under the same conditions as the single element binary post-blast
residue test series.

4.6. MULTI-ELEMENT BINARY POST-BLAST
The multi-element binary post-blast test series adds the complication of recovering
the taggant elements in the post-blast residue. A total of six combinations of the three
elements were each added to an undetonated explosive like the previous multi-element
standard solution test series. The concentrations used were doubled to 1,000 ppb, 2,000
ppb, or 4,000 ppb. These concentrations were used due to limits on measuring out the
required quantities of salts containing the taggant elements when used with changes that
were either approximately 150 grams or 50 grams. This would not be a problem when
scaled up to the volume that manufacturers of explosives produce. Each element was tested
twice each of the three concentrations. These charges used the same commercially
available binary explosive as used in the single element post-blast test. The same test
procedure was used as in the single element binary post-blast tests. Figure 4.2 shows the
setup of the tagged explosive in the steel cylinder before detonation (Figure 4.2a) and the
deposited post-blast residue after detonation (Figure 4.2b).
4.6.1. Determine if the Taggant Elements can be Detected and Quantified via
NAA at the Desired Concentration. This series of tests essentially used a cut down
version of the nuclear barcode with fewer total combinations. This represents a real world
test on detecting the taggant elements and determining their concentrations from the postblast residue using concentrations proposed by the nuclear barcode. Additionally, the
concentrations used in this series of tests are lower than the concentrations used in the
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single element binary post-blast series. This objective is met if the concentration of the
taggant elements can be measured in the post-blast residue.

(b)
(a)
Figure 4.2. Multi-Element Binary Post-Blast Charge and Witness Plate. Before
Detonation (a) and Deposited Post-Blast Residue after Detonation (b)

4.6.2. Determine the Distinguishability of the Taggant Elements from
Background Signal, such as other Taggant Elements and Common Elements in the
Environment such as Sodium, Potassium, Chlorine, etc. The multi-element binary
post-blast test series combines a test for the interference between different taggant elements
like the multi-element standard solution test series with a test for interference between the
taggant element and the post-blast residue like the single element binary post-blast test
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series. This series performs the first real-world tests designed to determine if the taggant
elements can simultaneously be found in the post-blast residue, which meets this objective
it this test series is able to do so.
4.6.3. Identify Concentrations of the Taggant Elements in the Post-Blast
Residues and Verify them to be the Same as in the Undetonated Sample. The
multi-element binary post-blast test series introduces two complications to the singleelement binary post-blast test series. First, the concentrations of two of the three taggant
elements in each test in the series fall within the range prescribed by the nuclear barcode.
Additionally, this test series introduces multiple taggant elements to the post-blast residue.
These concentrations need to be calculated simultaneously for the nuclear barcode concept
to prove functional. This test also will determine if the interference from the different
elements prevents the identification of the taggant elements or the determination of their
concentrations.

If the concentrations of the taggant elements can be measured

simultaneously and determined to be the same as the concentrations of the taggant elements
in the undetonated explosive, then this test series meets this objective.

4.7. MULTI-ELEMENT COMPOSITION B POST-BLAST
Not all explosives are equal. The multi-element composition B post-blast test series
used the same combinations of taggant elements and their concentrations that were used in
the multi-element binary post-blast test series but changed the type of explosive used from
a commercially produced binary explosive to the same composition B formulation used in
the single element Composition B post-blast tests. The single element Composition B postblast testing showed that Composition B produces much less post-residue than the binary
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explosive, which reduces the amount of taggant recovered in the post-blast residue
compared to the binary explosive.
4.7.1. Determine if the Taggant Elements can be Detected and Quantified via
NAA at the Desired Concentration. This series of tests was designed to determine if the
smaller quantity of post-blast residue gathered from these tests still permits the
simultaneous identification of the taggant elements and their concentrations. This test
series meets the objective under the same conditions as the multi-element binary post-blast
test series.
4.7.2. Determine the Distinguishability of the Taggant Elements from
Background Signal, such as other Taggant Elements and Common Elements in the
Environment such as Sodium, Potassium, Chlorine, etc. As with the single element
version of this test series, the multi-element composition B post-blast test series is designed
to show the effect of the reduced recovery of post-blast residue on the ability to distinguish
the different taggant elements in the post-blast residue. This test series meets this objective
under the same conditions as the multi-element binary post-blast test series.
4.7.3. Identify Concentrations of the Taggant Elements in the Post-Blast
Residues and Verify them to be the Same as in the Undetonated Sample. This test
compares the ability of NAA to accurately measure the concentration of the taggant
elements in the lower quantity of post-blast residue produced by the detonation of
Composition B compared to the binary used. This test series meets this objective if it is
possible to simultaneously measure the concentration of the taggant elements in the lower
amount of post-blast residue produced from Composition B and determine these
concentrations to be the same as in the undetonated explosive.
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4.8. MULTI-ELEMENT BINARY REPEATABILITY POST-BLAST
A series of repeatability tests where the same combination of taggant elements and
their concentrations were added to five separate charges of a commercially produced binary
explosive. 2,000 ppb of holmium, 1,000 ppb of samarium, and 4,000 ppb of europium
were added to five identical charges of each type of explosive. This test series followed
the same procedure described in the multi-element binary post-blast test series.
4.8.1. Determine if the Taggant Elements can be Detected and Quantified via
NAA at the Desired Concentration. This series of tests investigates how frequently the
taggant elements holmium, samarium, and europium can be expected to be recovered from
the post-blast residue when introduced at concentrations suggested by the nuclear barcode.
This has real-world implications by showing how many samples of the post-blast residue
will need to be obtained from the site of an actual detonation to definitively show the
presence and concentrations of the taggant elements. This test series successfully meets
this objective if the taggant elements can be simultaneously resolved and their
concentrations measured in each sample.
4.8.2. Determine if the Different Concentration Levels of the Taggant
Elements can be Distinguished and Quantified via NAA. While the uncertainty in the
concentrations can be obtained from any post-blast residue test series; the multi-element
binary repeatability series of tests represents the first series where a fuller determination of
the degree of concentration level separation that is feasible can occur. The uncertainties in
the measured concentrations of each element in the post-blast residue are determined five
times in this test series. This allows for the determination of the average uncertainty in the
concentration, as well as permitting more advanced statistical analysis of the uncertainties
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than would be possible with only one test. This series of tests produces a lower limit on
the separation between concentration levels that can be determined from measurements of
the post-blast residue for low explosives such as the ammonium nitrate based binary
explosive used in this series of experiments. This series of tests meets this objective if the
uncertainty in the concentrations, on average, is less than 50 ppb. This would permit the
nuclear barcode to use concentration levels separated by 100 ppb as designed.
4.8.3. Determine the Distinguishability of the Taggant Elements from
Background Signal, such as other Taggant Elements and Common Elements in the
Environment such as Sodium, Potassium, Chlorine, etc. The multi-element binary
repeatability test series is designed to determine if the taggant elements can consistently be
distinguished from other elements in the post-blast residue. Since the prepared explosive
charges are the same, the only variation will come from the process of depositing the postblast residue for each detonation. Establishing the consistent ability to distinguish the
taggant elements in the post-blast residue means that in a real usage scenario, fewer
samples of the post-blast residue will be needed to determine the presence or absence of
the nuclear barcode. This objective is met if at least one peak from each of the taggant
elements can be simultaneously identified in the NAA spectrum of the post-blast residue.
4.8.4. Identify Concentrations of the Taggant Elements in the Post-Blast
Residues and Verify them to be the Same as in the Undetonated Sample. The
multi-element binary repeatability test series should behave identically to the specific test
from the multi-element binary post-blast test that uses the same combination of
concentrations. This series of tests gathers more data about the performance of this one
combination of taggant elements and concentrations, which enables statistical analysis of
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the results for the particular combination used. This test meets this objective by accurately
measuring the concentration of the three taggant elements simultaneous and determining
them to be equal to the concentration in the undetonated explosive.

4.9. MULTI-ELEMENT COMPOSITION B REPEATABILITY POST-BLAST
A series of repeatability tests was also performed using composition B based
charges, that were otherwise the same as the tests in the multi-element binary repeatability
test series. This series of tests is necessary to show that this higher variance still permits
accurate determination of the concentration of the taggant elements used. Like the multielement binary repeatability tests, this series of tests also has real world implications on
the number of post-blast residue samples that will need to be collected.
4.9.1. Determine if the Taggant Elements can be Detected and Quantified via
NAA at the Desired Concentration. Since Composition B produces less post-blast
residue than the binary explosive used in the previous test, it presents a more challenging
test of determining the concentrations. Whether this test series meets this objective is
determined in the same method as the multi-element binary repeatability post-blast test
series.
4.9.2. Determine if the Different Concentration Levels of the Taggant
Elements can be Distinguished and Quantified via NAA. As with the multi-element
binary repeatability test, the multi-element composition B repeatability test yields more
information than would be offered by just a single test. Since composition B produces less
post-blast residue, and since the calculation of the concentration of the taggant elements
and their uncertainties depend in part on the mass of the post-blast residue that is recovered,
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this test series presents the most challenging situation for the nuclear barcode. The small
quantities of post-blast residue obtained must contain enough of the taggant elements to
determine the concentration levels. Additionally, this test series is necessary to determine
if the explosive used has some effect on the concentrations of the elements found in the
post-blast residue. This test series meets this objective in the same manner as the multielement binary repeatability test series.
4.9.3. Determine the Distinguishability of the Taggant Elements from
Background Signal, such as other Taggant Elements and Common Elements in the
Environment such as Sodium, Potassium, Chlorine, etc. Like the multi-element binary
repeatability test, the multi-element composition B repeatability test will allow the
determination of the consistency with which the taggant elements can be distinguished
from the remainder of the post-blast residue. The lower quantity of post-blast residue
available increases the variability in determining the concentrations of the taggant
elements. Using composition B could potentially increase the variability in distinguishing
the taggant elements in the post-blast residue due to the lower quantity of post-blast residue
and thus taggant elements collected. This test series meets this objective under the same
conditions as the multi-element binary repeatability post-blast test series.
4.9.4. Identify Concentrations of the Taggant Elements in the Post-Blast
Residues and Verify them to be the Same as in the Undetonated Sample. Like the
multi-element binary repeatability test, the multi-element composition B repeatability test
provides additional data points of the concentrations of the taggant elements collected from
post-blast residues of explosives tagged with a particular combination of taggant elements
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and concentrations.

The additional data also allows for statistical analysis of the

concentrations. Beyond this additional level of analysis, this test meets this objective under
the same conditions as the multi-element binary repeatability post-blast test series.
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5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Section 5 presents the results of performing NAA as described in Section 4.1 on
the samples from the tests described in Section 4.2 through 4.9. Additionally, at the end
of each test, a table is included that evaluates if the test meets or fails to meet each objective
that it was designed to evaluate. Section 5.9 provides an evaluation of each of the four
research objectives based on all of the tests that addressed them. Finally, Section 5.10
summarizes the test results.

5.1. SINGLE ELEMENT STANDARD SOLUTIONS
Identifying the taggant element is the first step towards being able to calculate the
concentration.

The results of performing NAA on five samples of five different

concentrations of the three elements are shown in Table 5.1, which shows the number of
times the taggant element was detected.

Table 5.1. Number of Completed Tests Where Taggant Element was Detected in Solution
Element
100 ppb
500 ppb
1000 ppb
Holmium
Yes – 5/5
Yes – 5/5
Yes – 5/5
Samarium
Yes – 5/5
Yes* – 4/4
Yes – 5/5
Europium
Yes – 5/5
Yes – 5/5
Yes – 5/5
* One of the tests failed due to detector malfunction.

2000 ppb
Yes – 5/5
Yes – 5/5
Yes – 5/5

4000 ppb
Yes – 5/5
Yes – 5/5
Yes – 5/5

The taggant element was identified in all of the completed tests. One of the
samarium 500 ppb samples suffered a detector failure during counting, so data was not
gathered for this sample. The failure of this detector delayed measurements of the
remaining 500 ppb samarium samples, as well as all 1,000 ppb, 2,000 ppb, and 4,000 ppb
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samples, which were all irradiated on the same day, by several days due to the time needed
for repairs. This led to a long delay between irradiating and counting samples that partially
inspired testing in Section 6, and that impacted the quality of the samarium results. All
samples were counted for 1 hour.
Calculating the concentration depends on identifying the peaks in the NAA
spectrum that correspond to the taggant elements and determining the number of counts
under that peak and subtracting the number of counts caused by background noise under
the peak. Appendix A presents a fully worked calculation of the concentration by this
method. This difference is the net number of counts under a given peak, and is the number
of counts associated with the taggant element. The average of the concentrations measured
in each test is followed by the average uncertainty in the concentration measured, and is
shown in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2. Averaged Measured Concentration and Concentration Uncertainty (in ppb)
Element
Holmium
Samarium
Europium

100 ppb
93.77 ±
12.40
610.13 ±
16.33
148.52 ±
0.71

500 ppb
498.49 ±
6.58
3,163.34 ±
216.62
816.31 ±
3.29

1000 ppb
5,538.96 ±
13.35
4,367.03 ±
82.45
1,546.19 ±
5.68

2000 ppb
11,311.11 ±
22.37
7,489.04 ±
67.25
2,708.40 ±
9.80

4000 ppb
22,176.36 ±
37.76
29,977.74 ±
158.16
6,466.16 ±
23.71

Except for the two lowest concentration holmium solutions, the measured
concentrations of the taggant elements in solution are much higher than what they should
be. These two tests utilized a different HPGe detector than the subsequent tests due to an
equipment failure. Figure 5.1 plots the relationship between the measured concentration
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on the y-axis and the concentration that was prepared by sequential dilution on the x-axis,
and excludes the two lowest concentration holmium solutions to keep the detector used
consistent. The error bars show the standard deviation of the measured concentration of
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Figure 5.1. Comparison of Added Concentrations of Single Taggant Elements to
Measured Concentrations in Solution

the samples at each nominal concentration. Results for each species individually are
presented in Appendix C.
As shown in Figure 5.1, the measured concentrations that are derived using
Equation 1 are substantially different from the actual concentration of the solutions. A
linear regression with a y intercept of zero was run on the averages for each concentration
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of one particular element to produce the lines shown. This regression shows that the results
for the europium (green) and holmium (blue) test series are very highly correlated with one
another, with an R2 value of 0.996 for the europium tests and an R2 value of 0.984 for the
holmium tests. The correlation coefficient for the samarium (red) tests is a lower 0.911.
A high correlation coefficient in a linear regression implies that there exists a constant
factor that is causing the difference.

The parameters for the linear regression are

summarized below in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3. Linearity of Measured Concentrations Showing Scale Factor (ratio) between
Measured Concentration and Added Concentration
Element
Holmium
Samarium
Europium

Scale Factor
5.51
6.63
1.56

R2 value
0.984
0.911
0.996

In Equation 3 there are two factors, in addition to the number of counts, that need
to be determined by experiment: the neutron flux, which under the test conditions should
be the thermal neutron flux of the MSTR 𝛷&C , and the probability that the detector will
count a given emitted gamma photon 𝜀. The calculated mass of the element, and thus the
concentration of the element is inversely related to these parameters.
The slope given by performing a linear regression shows the magnitude of the
constant error. For example, it shows that the error in one or both of these parameters is a
constant factor of 6.6274 for the samarium samples. This factor decreases for holmium to
5.5092 and further decreases for europium to 1.564. This trend matches the trend with the
parameter 𝜀, as HPGe detectors are much more efficient for lower energy gamma photons
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than higher energy gamma photons. The samarium concentrations are calculated from the
peak in the spectrum at 69.673 keV, the holmium concentrations from an 80.576 keV peak,
and the europium concentrations from a 344.29 keV peak. An error solely in the thermal
neutron flux parameter would be constant across the different taggant elements.
Despite the error in calculating the concentrations, most of the uncertainties in the
calculated concentration are less than 50 ppb. Therefore, utilizing concentration levels
separated by 100 ppb is feasible under these best-case scenarios for most tests. Resolving
the issue with the concentrations is expected to reduce the uncertainties but it is unknown
if the other uncertainties will be reduced to less than 50 ppb. Table 5.4 summarizes the
objectives the single element standard solutions test addresses and whether the test met
each objective.

Table 5.4. Single Element Standard Solutions Test Objectives Summary
Objective
Objective 1: Taggant Elements Measured?
Objective 2: Concentration ± 50 ppb?

Objective met or failed
Failed
11/15 Met
4/15 Failed

5.2. SINGLE ELEMENT BINARY POST-BLAST
The presence or absence of an element in the post-blast residue can be determined
by the presence or absence of a peak at the characteristic energy corresponding to the
element. Any other elements that were present in the post-blast residue did not interfere
with identifying what, if any, taggant elements were present. Results for the post-blast
tests using the different tagged binary charge are shown in Table 5.5 [36].
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For tests one and two, holmium was added to the undetonated explosive. In both
of these tests, the net number of counts under the peak is greater than the uncertainty in the
number of counts, and therefore holmium was found to be present in these tests.

Table 5.5. Taggant Elements Present, Net Counts, and Uncertainties of Holmium and
Samarium Tagged Binary Post-Blast Residues. (Bold Indicating Taggant Element was
Detected)
Test
1
2
3
4
5

Taggant Element
Added

Holmium Net Counts
(80.6 keV peak)

Samarium Net Counts
(69.6 keV peak)

Holmium
Holmium
Samarium
Samarium
Control

2,236 ± 668
98,026 ±1,744
63 ± 1,490
3,372 ± 1,762
766 ± 1,802

290 ± 1,306
10,872 ± 1,299
66,381 ± 2,589
849 ± 988

The results for samarium in these tests are shown as well, and indicate that
samarium was not found in the first test, and a measurement of the peak in the second test
was not able to be made due to a technical error where the software used failed to measure
the area under the peak [36].
For tests three and four, samarium was added to the undetonated explosive.

In

both of these tests, the number of net counts under the peak is once again larger than the
uncertainty in the number of counts, indicating that samarium was present in the samples.
Test three shows no presence of holmium in the sample. Test four shows a spurious
holmium presence, as an additional peak near, but not at, the energy corresponding to
holmium and can be disregarded [36].
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Figure 5.2 shows the NAA spectrum measured from each test between gamma
energies of 30 keV and 120 keV. The spectra are scaled to percent of the maximum value
in the time span so that all of them can be presented on a single chart.
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Figure 5.2. Comparison of NAA Spectra of Post-Blast Residues Containing Holmium
(green), Samarium (blue) or no Taggants (orange)

The number of net counts listed in Table 5.5 is the net number of counts under the
peak at 80.6 keV and 69.7 keV for the holmium counts and the samarium counts
respectively. The single element standard solutions test series identified these peaks in
particular to be the most specific for these two elements. In test 4, the only test where a
non-taggant element was found in the post-blast residue, there is a small peak at 82.5 keV.
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The range of energies covered by the 82.5 keV peak in test 4, and the range of energies
around 80.6 keV from holmium in tests 1 and 2 partially overlap. When this area is counted
for the test 4 results, this small peak at 82.5 keV contributes to the counts shown under the
“Holmium Net Counts”, but is not actually from the presence of holmium. While the net
counts for test 4 technically meet the criteria to say that holmium is present, the asterisk in
the table denotes that holmium was not truly detected.
These tests also used the same irradiation parameters as the solution tests in the
previous subsections. One change between them though was the addition of a delay period
between counting and irradiating the samples. Due to the presence of additional elements
in the post-blast residue that were not found in the solution based tests, the total activity of
the irradiated samples was too high to accurately obtain an NAA spectrum. As a result, a
48 hour delay time was implemented. The tests are summarized in Table 5.6, and show the
taggant element, the concentration of the taggant element in the undetonated explosive,
and the measured concentration of the taggant element in the post-blast residue.

Table 5.6. Single Element Binary Post-Blast Test Undetonated Concentrations and
Measured Post-Blast Residue Concentrations (in ppb)
Test
1
2
3
4

Taggant Element
Holmium
Holmium
Samarium
Samarium

Taggant Undetonated
Concentration
19,600
19,600
19,700
20,100

Measured Post-Blast
Residue Concentration
5,289 ± 30
79,230 ± 1,410
13,690 ± 560
1,320 ±160

The measured concentrations of taggant elements in these tests is scattered, but
none of them match the undetonated concentration. Tests 1 and 3 are of the same order of
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magnitude as the concentration in the undetonated explosive. Tests 2 and 4 are both very
far off from the concentration in the undetonated explosive, though in different directions.
Table 5.7 summarizes the objectives the single element binary post-blast test addresses and
whether the test met each objective.

Table 5.7. Single Element Binary Post-Blast Test Objectives Summary
Objective
Objective 3: Taggant found above
Background?
Objective 4: Concentration same in postblast residue and undetonated?

Objective met or failed
Met
Failed

5.3. SINGLE ELEMENT COMPOSITION B POST-BLAST
The series of tests performed using a Composition B focused on identifying the
taggant element holmium, when added to the undetonated explosive, in the post-blast
residue.

Since post-blast residues contain many elements, the primary concern is

determining if the taggant elements can be found. Results for the post-blast tests using a
tagged composition B charge are shown in Table 5.8.

Table 5.8. Taggant Elements Present, Net Counts, and Uncertainties of Holmium Tagged
Composition B Post-Blast Residue. (Bold Indicating Taggant Element was Detected)
Test
Taggant Element
Holmium Net Counts
1
Holmium
54,523 ± 820
2
Holmium
5,384 ± 42,206*
* Denotes that although this test fails the objective criterion used, further analysis shows
that holmium is present in this test sample
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Test 1 clearly shows the presence of holmium in the post-blast residue. Test 2 does
not. However, on inspecting the NAA spectrum from Test 2, which is shown in Figure
5.3, there is a clear peak at the 80.6 keV that is expected for holmium. The additional peak
around 49 keV is also indicative of holmium, but is not used to definitively identify
holmium due to other elements having peaks that interfere with this holmium peak. The
asterisk in the table denotes that although the number of net counts does not show the
presence of the taggant element, the spectrum clearly does. While the software can be
helpful, it is necessary to make sure that the results are examined closely.

Figure 5.3. NAA Spectrum from Test 2 of Single Element Composition B Post-Blast
Series Showing the Presence of Holmium at 80.6 keV
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The goal of this series of tests was to determine if the taggant elements can be
identified in the post-blast residue. These tests were carried out like the single element
binary post-blast tests and included a delay time of 48 hours. These results are shown in
Table 5.9.

Table 5.9. Single Element Composition B Post-Blast Test Undetonated Concentrations
and Measured Post-Blast Residue Concentrations (in ppb)
Test
1
2

Taggant Element

Taggant Undetonated
Concentration

Measured Post-Blast
Residue Concentration

Holmium
Holmium

14,300
13,900

29,970,000 ± 3,561,000
882,100 ± 6,915,000

The concentration of the taggant element is higher in the post-blast residue than in
the undetonated explosive. Combing these results and the results from the single element
of the explosive is converted to gaseous products while some small fraction of the mass of
binary post blast tests imply that it is unlikely that the concentration of the taggant element
in the post-blast residue remains the same as in the undetonated explosive, and is instead
higher in the post-blast residue than the undetonated explosive. The likely explanation for
this is that during detonation, some fraction of the undetonated explosive is only partially
reacted and becomes post-blast residue. The taggant elements used do not form gaseous
products, and would remain behind in the solid phase.

This process increases the

concentration of the taggant elements relative to their concentration in the undetonated
explosive.
The uncertainties in the concentrations here are also extremely high and seem to
show that, for these tests at least, the uncertainty is too high to use concentration levels
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separated by 100 ppb. Since the measurement is of the mass concentration of the taggant
element in the post-blast residue, it is necessary to convert the mass that can be calculated
using Equation 4 to find the concentration.

The markedly higher concentration

uncertainties are due to the small quantity of post-blast residue recovered as well as how
close these quantities are to the precision of the balance used for the measurement. The
quantity of post-blast residue recovered from these two tests is approximately two orders
of magnitude smaller than the quantities recovered from the single element binary postblast tests. Table 5.10 summarizes the objectives the single element Composition B postblast test addresses and whether the test met each objective.

Table 5.10. Single Element Composition B Post-Blast Test Objectives Summary
Objective
Objective 3: Taggant found above
Background?
Objective 4: Concentration same in postblast residue and undetonated?

Objective met or failed
Met
Failed

5.4. MULTI-ELEMENT STANDARD SOLUTIONS
The multi-element standard solutions build on the single element standard solution
tests by preparing samples that contained all three of the taggant elements in various
concentrations. The presence of multiple elements produces more gammas, which could
create either too much noise or overlapping peaks in the NAA spectrum and prevent
accurately identifying the individual taggant elements. Six total combinations of the three
elements at three different concentrations (500 ppb, 1,000 ppb, and 2,000 ppb) were
prepared. For each mixture, five samples were prepared and tested. The different mixtures
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that were prepared, the concentrations of the three taggant elements used in each mixture,
and the number of tests out of five where the elements were detected are shown in Table
5.11.

Table 5.11. Multi Element Standard Solutions Table; Number of Tests out of Five where
Taggant Elements in Multi-Element Standard Solutions were Detected. Each
Combination in Parentheses
Mixture #
1
2
3
4
5
6

Holmium
500 ppb (5)
500 ppb (5)
1,000 ppb (5)
1,000 ppb (5)
2,000 ppb (5)
2,000 ppb (5)

Samarium
1,000 ppb (5)
2,000 ppb (5)
500 ppb (5)
2,000 ppb (5)
500 ppb (5)
1,000 ppb (5)

Europium
2,000 ppb (5)
1,000 ppb (5)
2,000 ppb (5)
500 ppb (5)
1,000 ppb (5)
500 ppb (5)

The taggant elements could be identified as separate elements in every test at these
concentrations. This experiment indicates that these taggant elements will be able to be
identified at all the concentration levels of the nuclear barcode. The multi-element standard
solution series of tests was able to answer whether or not the three taggant elements would
interfere with identifying one another.
A representative spectrum showing a sample of the low energy peaks created by
each element is shown in Figure 5.4, which shows that the peaks do not overlap and are
easily identified. Five samples of each combination of concentrations were prepared and
NAA was performed. The average measured concentrations of the taggant elements in
these tests are shown in Table 5.12.
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Table 5.12. Averaged Measured Concentrations of Multi Element Standard Solutions in
Parts per Billion. (Abbreviated as Concentration of Holmium: Concentration of
Samarium: Concentration of Europium)
Element

500:1000:
2000
3,378.56
Holmium
± 49.25
4,125.91
Samarium
± 42.18
13,735.85
Europium
± 131.09

500:2000
:1000
3,348.21
± 48.57
3,772.04
± 95.70
1,218.92
± 7.95

1000:500
:2000
4,894.96
± 54.18
926.37 ±
66.90
2,663.69
± 11.77

1000:2000
:500
3,322.31 ±
30.22
3,635.08 ±
45.55
628.67 ±
3.22

2000:500
:1000
6,827.21
± 28.82
473.63 ±
56.95
1,010.37
± 5.23

2000:1000
:500
4,665.52 ±
44.29
2,112.78 ±
32.13
578.77 ±
3.07

Figure 5.4. NAA Spectrum of a Representative Multi-Element Standard Solution.
Containing 2000 ppb Holmium, 1000 ppb Samarium, and 500 ppb Europium. Peaks
(circled) Correspond to Holmium (solid), Samarium (dashed), and Europium (dotted)
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The same problem appears in these calculations for the concentration as in the
calculations for the single element standard solution concentrations.

As such, the

calculated concentrations measured do not match up with the nominal concentrations.
Plotting the average measured concentration against the nominal concentration produces
Figure 5.5. A total of six combinations of the three taggant elements at three different
concentrations were created and measured. Therefore, each element is present at each
concentration twice, and error bars show the standard deviation in the measured
concentration.
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Figure 5.5. Comparison of Added Concentrations of Multiple Taggant Elements to
Measured Concentrations in Solution

94
Unlike the single element standard solution concentrations, the results from this
series of tests are less conclusive about the reason for the measured concentrations being
much higher than what the concentrations should be. The parameters for the linear
regression are summarized below in Table 5.13.

Table 5.13. Linearity of Measured Concentrations showing Scale Factor between
Measured Concentration and Added Concentration
Element
Holmium
Samarium
Europium

Scale Factor
3.29
2.07
3.39

R2 value
0.306
0.597
0.415

Unlike the single element solution tests, instead of R2 values of at least 0.9, the
absolute value of the R2 values falls within the range of 0.3 to 0.59. This range is generally
considered to be insufficient to say that there exists a correlation. However, this range of
correlation coefficients also does not imply the lack of a correlation either.
In addition to the R2 values being different from the single element case, the scale
factor between the measured concentration and the actual concentration is different.
Notably, these scale factors are closer together than the ones seen with the single element
case. The cause for this is uncertain, but would imply the opposite of the single element
solution tests. These results imply that there is a constant error factor, possibly in the
reactor flux. Table 5.14 summarizes the objectives the multi-element standard solutions
test addresses and whether the test met each objective.
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Table 5.14. Multi-Element Standard Solution Test Objectives Summary
Objective
Objective 1: Taggant Elements Measured?

Objective met or failed
Failed
13/18 Met
5/18 Failed

Objective 2: Concentration ± 50 ppb?
Objective 3: Taggant found above
Background?

Met

5.5. MULTI-ELEMENT BINARY POST-BLAST
As with the single element post-blast tests, the presence and absence of elements
can be assessed by determining the net number of counts under the peaks, and the
uncertainties in the net counts, corresponding to that element in the NAA spectrum
obtained from the sample. The net counts and the uncertainties for each of the three taggant
elements used for tests one through six in this series are shown in Table 5.15.

Table 5.15. Taggant Elements Present, Net Counts, and Uncertainties in Multi-Element
Binary Post-Blast Residues. (Bold Indicating Taggant Element was Detected)
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6

Holmium
Net Counts
377.27 ±
172.55
551.95 ±
273.78
147.09 ±
325.00
122.32 ±
194.84
216.11 ±
200.87
118.49 ±
148.10

Holmium
Present

Samarium
Net Counts
744.72 ±
294.59

Samarium
Present

Europium
Net Counts

Europium
Present

Yes

0

No

Yes

0

No

0

No

No

2,383.53 ±
359.49

Yes

0

No

No

0

No

0

No

No

0

No

Yes

0

No

Yes

Yes
No

180.80 ±
243.56
774.50 ±
163.65
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In each of these tests, europium could not be identified. There are two possible
reasons for this. Europium has two stable, naturally occurring isotopes,

151

Eu and

153

Eu

[38]. During NAA, these elements produce isotopes that have relatively long half-lives on
the order of several years. This long half-life, however, makes these elements relatively
inactive, and thus they require longer counting times, making their use not feasible for this
experiment. Activation also produces the europium isotope 152m1Eu, a metastable isotope
with a half-life of 9.29 hours [38]. This more active isotope is the one that has been used
to specifically identify the presence of europium. The post-blast residue sample from the
first test in this series began counting 70 hours after irradiation. This delay was necessary
to allow safe handling of the samples due to the activity of some shorter lived isotopes
including manganese, silicon, and aluminum that were picked up from the environment.
This period of time is approximately 7.5 half-lives, so the amount of the active isotope
being measured has been reduced by a factor of 27.5, or approximately 1/186th of its original
concentration.

Therefore, the activated europium allows for a considerably shorter

counting time, but it may be too unstable to be seen after the required delay period.
The second possible reason for the absence of europium in the post-blast samples
is that none of the added europium taggant was collected. While the elements added to the
explosive cannot be destroyed during the detonation process, it could be that the europium
partitions in the cloud of particulate material generated by the detonating explosive
differently than holmium and samarium due to either physical characteristics such as
atomic weight or density, or due to chemical characteristics such as reactivity with the
detonation products. This possibility will need further study. However, since all three
elements are rare earth elements, they should be chemically similar, which suggests they
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should act similarly during detonation. Additionally, rare earths commonly have similar
physical characteristics as well. While the data collected cannot discriminate between the
two possible reasons, we consider it more likely that the time delay between irradiating the
samples and counting them is responsible for the lack of any measurable quantity of
europium in the samples.
The results for holmium are positive. All samples showed traces of holmium,
however tests three, four, and six did not show more net counts than the uncertainty in the
measurement. A peak at the correct energy for holmium was observable for each test,
similar to the results for test two of the single element composition B test series, but the
measured net counts do not meet our criteria for stating that holmium is present in those
tests.
The results for samarium are mixed. In two samples, no trace of a samarium peak
at 69.6 keV was found. From the single and multi-element standard solutions tests, this
peak was found to be the most specific peak indicating the presence of samarium, despite
larger peaks present at 41.5 and 103.1 keV which had other peaks close enough to interfere
with measurement. Of the remaining tests, three showed net counts well in excess of the
uncertainty, and one does not meet that criteria. The results from test five, like the holmium
results from tests three, four, and six; have noticeable peaks, but do not meet the criterion
to say that samarium is present.
In the end, this test did not provide a clear answer to determining if the taggant
elements interfere with one another. In all the tests where the taggant elements can be
shown to be present, their peaks are distinct from those from other elements present in the
sample. However, due to the presence of other environmental material, the post-blast
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residue becomes highly active when irradiated under the test conditions, and a period of
time is needed to allow the samples to “cool” sufficiently so that they can be handled safely.
This period of time was too long for the 9.29 hour half-life of metastable 152m1Eu isotope.
More tests will need to be performed in future work to fully evaluate the suitability of
europium for use in the Nuclear Barcode. Both holmium and samarium are recommended
as successful candidates for the Nuclear barcode and with the increased knowledge from
this study, additional taggant options will be selected with similar half-lives for ease of
reading the barcode post detonation.
As with the single element post-blast tests, a delay time between irradiating and
counting the samples was added, however this period varied between the different tests in
this series. Table 5.16 shows the measured concentrations of the taggant elements in the
post-blast residue created by the binary charges.

Table 5.16. Multi-Element Binary Post-Blast Series Concentration and Their
Uncertainties (in ppb)
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6

Holmium
Concentrations
4,544.33 ± 9,305.14
17,080.33 ± 254,950.59
1,567.97 ± 2,494.45
3,222.75 ± 29,804.05
n/a
4,105.55 ± 32,607.88

Samarium
Concentrations
13,487.41 ± 2,7617.31
5,072.96 ± 8,070.45
n/a
32.00 ± 254,144.73

Europium
Concentrations
n/a
-

It is immediately obvious that these concentrations are inconsistent.

One

contributor to this might be that concentration uncertainties are all higher than the
calculated concentrations. This is mostly because of the uncertainty from the quantity of
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post-blast residue that was recovered. The in all cases, not much post-blast residue was
recovered, which likely also contributed to the issue with test five where the measured
mass was less than zero, and no concentrations were calculated for this sample. These
concentrations do not match up well to the concentrations of the undetonated explosive
except for the holmium concentration in test 6 which should be 4,000 ppb and was
measured at 4,105.55 ppb. That the uncertainty is eight times larger than the measured
value makes this result unreliable, however.
Additionally, only holmium was detectable in all tests. Europium was not detected
in any of the tests that were performed, and samarium was only detected some of the time.
It is not surprising that europium was not found: almost 7.5 half-lives had elapsed, and
therefore the activated europium decayed away. On the other hand, holmium has a halflife of 26.8 hours, and so some holmium should still be present. The fact that samarium
was not detected, despite the longer half-life of the activated samarium isotope used (Sm154), of 46 hours makes analysis difficult. No trace of samarium was found in tests 2 and
4, even though samarium should be comparatively long lived; it can only be concluded that
samarium was not present in the post-blast residues from these samples.

Table 5.17

summarizes the objectives the multi-element binary post-blast test addresses and whether
the test met each objective.

5.6. MULTI-ELEMENT COMPOSITION B POST-BLAST
This series of tests on tagged composition B uses the same combination of three
elements at three concentration levels to create six unique combinations of taggants that
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Table 5.17. Multi-Element Binary Post-Blast Test Objectives Summary
Objective
Objective 1: Taggant Elements Measured?
Objective 3: Taggant found above
Background?
Objective 4: Concentration same in postblast residue and undetonated?

Objective met or failed
Failed
6/18 Met
12/18 Failed
Failed

was used in the multi-element binary post-blast test series described previously in Section
5.5. Comparing the number of net counts to the uncertainty in the net counts provides a
good method of identifying if the taggant element is present in the sample. These are
presented below in Table 5.18.

Table 5.18. Taggant Elements Present, Net Counts, and Uncertainties in Multi-Element
Composition B Post-Blast Residues. (Bold Indicating Taggant Element was Detected)
Test

Holmium
Net Counts
91.107 ±
236.34
312.68 ±
198.07
99.40 ±
351.30
352.03 ±
203.59

Holmium
Present

5

0

No

6

91.66 ±
96.99

No

1
2
3
4

No
No
No
Yes

Samarium
Net Counts
124.90 ±
211.64
705.81 ±
259.58
445.28 ±
183.78
1,466.35 ±
254.15
223.20 ±
159.70
537.86 ±
208.04

Samarium
Present

Europium
Net Counts

Europium
Present

No

0

No

Yes

96.14 ±
235.48

No

Yes

0

No

Yes

141.91 ±
529.62

No

Yes

0

No

Yes

0

No

Results are similar to the binary post-blast tests. Samarium and holmium can be
found in most tests, while europium cannot be definitively located. Unlike the tests on
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binary post-blast samples, europium peaks can be noticed in the spectra of some tests, but
insufficient counts are available for adequate quantification in others. The amount of
europium measured here is small and considered “not detected”. These samples were
counted approximately 20 hours sooner than the samples from the mixed element binary
post-blast test series. This additional data supports the hypothesis that the problem locating
europium is radioactive decay.
The peaks of the three taggant elements are all well separated from the peaks
coming from other elements present in the sample. However, not all samples showed peaks
for all three taggant elements. This partially addresses the objective of determining if the
taggant elements interfere with one another or are lost in the background. Taggant peaks
are located at distinct energies from the background, but the peaks can be lost due to the
time needed to allow the samples to be handled after activation.
The same six mixtures of the three taggant elements were added to composition B
charges prepared the same way as in the single element tests. All other parameters of the
test were identical between this test series and the previous test series. The measured
concentrations are presented in Table 5.19.

Table 5.19. Multi-Element Composition B Post-Blast Series Concentration and
Uncertainties (in ppb)
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6

Holmium Concentration
5,593.31 ± 154,939.27
1,245.23 ± 123.14
765.29 ± 274.40
845.15 ± 24.42
589.72 ± 126.40

Samarium Concentration
9,413.34 ± 260,757.29
3,744.33 ± 379.27
4,097.66 ± 1,469.27
4,154.91 ± 119.79
6,530.26 ± 5,496.39
3,973.96 ± 851.76

Europium Concentration
656.19 ± 64.91
654.98 ± 20.70
-
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The measured concentrations from this series of tests, like the binary tests in Table
5.16, are mixed. This implies that the results are not directly dependent on the type of
explosive used. The concentrations measured from the post-blast residue are not close to
the prepared concentrations of the tagged charges. The uncertainties in the concentrations
are generally better than expected, in general being at least the same magnitude of the
concentration, and often better. The exception is test one. Test one was the lightest sample,
weighing one order of magnitude less than the other samples. This shows the effect that
the collected mass of post-blast residue has on the measured concentration uncertainties of
the taggant elements. Recovering more of the post-blast residue will lead to lower
uncertainties in the measured concentrations.
This series of tests behaves more sensibly than the binary ones. Samarium is always
detected, holmium sometimes, and europium less frequently. This follows the relationship
between the half-lives of the isotopes used to measure the presence of these elements.
Additionally, the delay between irradiating and counting these samples was shorter than
the previous test series by 20 hours, for a time delay of approximately 48 hours. These
tests also have smaller uncertainties in the concentration than the previous test series,
excluding test one which has high uncertainty because less post-blast residue was collected.
Table 5.20 summarizes the objectives the multi-element Composition B post-blast test
addresses and whether the test met each objective.

5.7. MULTI-ELEMENT BINARY REPEATABILITY
Variation between samples is expected, so by using identical charges, information
about the repeatability of the nuclear barcode can be obtained. This series of tests can
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Table 5.20. Multi-Element Composition B Post-Blast Test Objectives Summary
Objective
Objective 1: Taggant Elements Measured?
Objective 3: Taggant found above
Background?
Objective 4: Concentration same in postblast residue and undetonated?

Objective met or failed
Failed
5/18 Met
13/18 Failed
Failed

provide additional information about the recoverability of the individual elements. Like
previous tests, comparing the net counts to the uncertainty in the net counts is a
straightforward test for the presence of the taggant elements. These data are shown in
Table 5.21.

Table 5.21. Taggant Elements Present, Net counts, and Uncertainties in Multi-Element
Binary Repeatability Post-Blast Residues. (Bold Indicating Taggant Element was
Detected)
Test
1
2
3
4
5

Holmium
Net Counts
538.71 ±
197.90
394.81 ±
170.12
2,709.14 ±
224.31
176.38 ±
484.80
382.73 ±
244.62

Holmium
Present
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Samarium
Net Counts
1,815.94 ±
389.52
290.30 ±
120.63
1,162.77 ±
226.54
1,381.30 ±
204.16
1,773.01 ±
255.60

Samarium
Present
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Europium
Net Counts
521.29 ±
280.97
227.79 ±
291.55
286.42 ±
250.78
201.56 ±
272.21
439.94 ±
299.55

Europium
Present
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

There were three instances where an element was not found in the post-blast
residue: europium in the second test, and both holmium and europium in the fourth test.
The advantage of this series of tests is the same concentrations of taggant elements were
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added to undetonated explosive. Despite the noisy environment produced during
detonation and seen in NAA, the taggant elements could be identified in 12 of 15 cases in
this series of tests. An example of the NAA spectrum of a post-blast residue sample is
included in Figure 5.6.
Additional elements in the sample produce their own gammas and due to scattering
and reflection produce extra background in the NAA spectrum. This is a normal process
and happens with all samples that undergo NAA, however searching for trace elements
such as the taggant elements used in the nuclear barcode exacerbates the issue. This
process of losing energy produces a broad spectrum of photons from the narrow peaks
emitted by a radioactive species, and multiple species all increase this broad spectrum
noise. There were three occasions where the taggant elements could not be positively
identified because the number of net counts was lower than the uncertainty: holmium in
test 4, and europium in tests 2 and 4. In those cases, the peak was not present.
A key component to the workings of the Nuclear Barcode is the repeatability of the
measurement of the taggant. Measurements of the same batch of explosive must all
produce the same results. The concentrations for each element across each of the five
samples should be the same, since the charges were prepared identically. The measured
concentrations for each of the five charges, as well as the average across all five
measurements, are shown in Table 5.22.
Uniquely among all of the post-blast tests performed, all three taggant elements
were detected in every test. This test series required a delay of 48 hours between irradiating
and counting the samples of these post-blast tests for the samples to become sufficiently
cool to handle. Because this delay was small, measurements of each of the taggant
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Figure 5.6. Example NAA Spectrum of Post-Blast Residue. (note: This is a Zoomed in
Figure and Cuts off a Peak at Approximately 5 keV Reaching 90,000 Counts and the
Peak in the Center at 1293 keV Reaching 10,000 Counts to Show more of the Peaks
that are Present in the Spectrum)

Table 5.22. Multi-Element Binary Repeatability Post-Blast Series Concentrations and
Uncertainties (in ppb)
Test
1
2
3
4
5
Average

Holmium
Concentrations
1,869.02 ± 686.62
7,304.70 ± 3,147.48
16,696.67 ± 1,382.48
747.11 ± 2,053.52
697.99 ± 446.10
5,463.10 ± 1,543.24

Samarium
Concentrations
7,331.87 ± 1,572.70
6,315.29 ± 2,624.15
8,536.70 ± 1,663.18
7,057.98 ± 1,043.17
3,949.62 ± 569.37
6,638.29 ± 1,494.51

Europium
Concentrations
3,703.48 ± 1,996.12
8,239.27 ± 10,545.35
3,255.58 ± 2,850.56
1,488.50 ± 2,010.25
1,322.72 ± 900.633
3,601.91 ± 3,480.46
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elements were able to be obtained. Looking first at the average concentrations, the
measured concentrations are off, but at least of the correct order of magnitude. The
uncertainties are high, with holmium and samarium having very similar average
uncertainties, and europium having an uncertainty nearly identical to the measured
concentration.
Going through the tests individually provides some additional information.
Europium has two pairs of measurements that are close to one another in tests 1 and 3 as
well as tests 4 and 5. Test 2 however, shows much higher amounts of europium than any
of the previous tests, and also has the highest uncertainty by far. Samarium is more
consistent, with only test 5 particularly far from any of the others. Tests 1 through 4 have
samarium measurements that are the same, taking the uncertainties into account. Holmium
has an outlier in test 3, and unpredictable behavior in the other tests. Why this particular
sample has so much holmium compared to the other ones is unknown.
For these tests, the uncertainty is predominantly a function of the quantity of postblast residue recovered. The concentration of the taggant element is measured by dividing
the mass of the taggant element calculated using Equation 3 by this mass, and multiplying
by 109 to give parts per billion. When the mass of the post-blast residue is small, the
uncertainty then becomes a larger fraction of the total mass, and thus contributes more than
under other circumstances.
The concentration and uncertainty in each element across each test are shown in
Figure 5.7.

107
20000
18000

Measured Cocentration (ppb)

16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
Ho measured concentration Sm measured concentration
Sample 1

Sample 2

Sample 3

Sample 4

Eu measured concentration
Sample 5

Figure 5.7. Repeatability of Measured Concentration of the Three Taggant Elements
across Five Tests and Their Uncertainties. All Measured Concentrations should be the
same for each Element
The measured concentrations and their uncertainties vary depending on the test.
This suggests that using the nuclear barcode in the field will require obtaining multiple
samples to read it. The concentrations for each element across each sample should be the
same, since the charges were prepared identically.
The concentrations of the taggant elements can be determined. However, these
concentrations are suspect due to the issue shown with both the single element standard
solution series and the multi-element standard solution series.

The calculated

concentrations do not match the concentrations of the taggant elements that were added to
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the undetonated explosive. Table 5.23 summarizes the objectives the multi-element binary
post-blast repeatability test addresses and whether the test met each objective.

Table 5.23. Multi-Element Binary Post-Blast Repeatability Test Objectives Summary
Objective
Objective 1: Taggant Elements Measured?
Objective 2: Concentration ± 50 ppb?
Objective 3: Taggant found above
Background?
Objective 4: Concentration same in postblast residue and undetonated?

Objective met or failed
Failed
Failed
15/18 Met
3/18 Failed
Failed

5.8. MULTI-ELEMENT COMPOSITION B REPEATABILITY
This series of tests used the same concentrations of each of the three taggant
elements that were used in the previous section. To show the detectability of these
elements, the net counts and the uncertainties in the net counts that were obtained from the
post-blast residues from this series of tests are shown below in Table 5.24.

Table 5.24. Taggant Elements Present, Net Counts, and Uncertainties in Multi-Element
Composition B Repeatability Post-Blast Residues. (Bold Indicating Taggant Element was
Detected)
Test
1
2
3
4
5

Holmium
Net Counts
197.37 ±
97.90

Holmium
Present

0

No

231.31 ±
217.42
165.45 ±
207.91
138.68 ±
161.62

Yes

Yes
No
No

Samarium
Net Counts
30.65 ±
631.94
328.98 ±
155.69
110.01 ±
156.95
126.14 ±
89.52

Samarium
Present

Europium
Net Counts

Europium
Present

No

0

No

Yes

0

No

No

0

No

Yes

0

No

0

No

0

No
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Peaks corresponding to holmium and samarium can be seen in all but one test each,
however these elements can only be definitively said to be present in a couple tests.
Holmium can only be said to be present in tests one and three, while samarium can only be
said to be present in tests two and four.

Once again, the time between irradiation and

counting appears to have allowed for any activated europium to decay away.

The

composition B repeatability post-blast residue tests had a roughly 12.5% higher delay time
(54 hours vs. 48 hours) between irradiating the sample and counting them compared to the
binary repeatability post-blast residue tests. This additional time could account for the
difference in the detectability of europium in the two test series.
The taggant element peaks can be readily distinguished from peaks resulting from
other background elements present in the sample. However, not all samples showed
notable peaks for the taggant elements. Taking additional samples of the post-blast residue
would provide additional data points to determine if the elements are truly not present in
the post-blast residue for those tests, or if they were not identifiable in that particular sample
of the post-blast residue.
This series of tests, like the previous series of multi-element binary repeatability
post-blast series, added the same concentration of taggant elements to the explosive charges
used. This should allow for a test of the repeatability of this experiment. The calculated
uncertainty in the measured concentration of the taggant elements does not fall within the
50 ppb needed to have concentration levels separated by 100 ppb as the nuclear barcode is
designed for. The measured concentrations of each taggant element and the averaged
concentration across each of the five tests are shown in Table 5.25.
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Table 5.25. Multi-Element Composition B Repeatability Post-Blast Series Concentrations
and Uncertainties (in ppb)
Test

Holmium Concentration

Samarium Concentration

1
2
3
4
5
Average

11,789.27 ± 23,000.32
14,216.78 ± 30,461.49
20,793.77 ± 206,284.12
5,117.26 ± 4,659.43
10,383.42 ± 44,097.56

2,062.15 ± 4,023.16
1,546.49 ± 13.56
7,836.76 ± 16,890.60
18,620.15 ± 184,720.76
6,013.11 ± 41,129.61

Europium
Concentration
-

This test series required a delay time of 54 hours for the samples to decay enough
to be safely measured. As a result, sufficient time elapsed for the activated europium to
decay.

An additional difference between these tests and the tests involving binary

explosives is that the quantity of post-blast residue collected from the Composition B tests
is much lower. As a result, the effects of the uncertainty in the measurement of the quantity
of post-blast residue begin to dominate the calculation for the total uncertainty in the
measured concentration of the taggant elements.
The measured concentrations of both holmium and samarium are not close to the
quantity that were added to the explosive charges. The measured quantities are incorrect
by a similar factor (5x for holmium vs. 6x for samarium). This seems to be more of a
coincidence based on the size of the uncertainties. In tests 1, 3, and 4 where both elements
were detected, the uncertainty in the concentration is larger than the measured
concentration. This indicates that these measurements are unreliable.
The concentrations of holmium and samarium found in the samples from this test
are included in Figure 5.8. Note that in an ideal case, the concentrations across each test
would be the same.
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The uncertainty in the measured concentration for the fourth sample is this series
of tests is cut off to better show the measurements of the concentrations. Europium
concentrations are not included in this figure because no europium peaks were found during
testing. The shown concentrations are not similar to one another. Additionally, the
uncertainties in each test are much larger than the necessary 50 ppb. Obtaining multiple
samples, and acquiring large individual samples of the post-blast residue should increase
the accuracy of the concentration measurement of the post-blast residue and reduce the
magnitude of the uncertainty of the measured concentration.
As with previous samples, the taggant element peaks can be readily distinguished
from peaks resulting from other background elements present in the sample. However, not
all samples showed notable peaks for the taggant elements. Taking additional samples of
the post-blast residue would provide additional data points to determine if the elements are
truly not present in the post-blast residue for those tests, or if they were not identifiable in
that particular sample of the post-blast residue.
These concentrations do not match the concentrations of the taggant elements that
were present in the undetonated explosive. Additionally, there is still the unresolved
difficulty with calculating the concentrations of the elements that was initially shown in
the first series of single element standard solutions. Once this error is resolved, a better
determination of the accuracy of these results should be possible. Table 5.26 summarizes
the objectives the multi-element Composition B post-blast repeatability test addresses and
whether the test met each objective.
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Figure 5.8. Repeatability of Measured Concentration of the Two Detected Elements
across Five Tests and Their Uncertainties. Each Concentration Should be the Same.
Europium was used as a Taggant, but was not Detected in any of the Samples, so it was
not Included in this Figure

Table 5.26. Multi-Element Composition B Post-Blast Repeatability Test Objectives
Summary
Objective
Objective 1: Taggant Elements Measured?
Objective 2: Concentration ± 50 ppb?
Objective 3: Taggant found above
Background?
Objective 4: Concentration same in postblast residue and undetonated?

Objective met or failed
Failed
Failed
4/18 Met
14/18 Failed
Failed
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5.9. EVALUATION OF POST-BLAST SURVIVABILITY OBJECTIVES
The objective of this research has been to evaluate the survivability of the Nuclear
Barcode identification taggant concept.

To evaluate this property, the concept of

survivability was broken down into a series of four objectives that the Nuclear Barcode
must satisfy in order to meet the definition of a survivable taggant. These four objectives
then informed the design of a series of eight experiments.

1. Determine if the taggant elements can be detected and quantified via NAA at the
desired concentrations.

2. Determine if the different concentration levels of the taggant elements can be
distinguished via NAA with sufficient precision that the measured concentration
lies within only one concentration level (50 ppb precision to use the Nuclear
Barcode as designed).

3. Determine the distinguishability of the taggant elements from the background, such
as other taggant elements and other common elements in the environment such as
sodium, potassium, chlorine, etc.

4. Identify concentrations of the taggant elements in the post blast residues and verify
them to be the same as in the undetonated sample.
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5.9.1. Research Objective One. The results of the experiments described in the
previous sections show that NAA performs well in identifying the presence or absence of
three taggant elements: holmium, samarium, and europium. The technique is sound, and
is now considered a reference technique for the measurement of composition of a material
[7]. The current results for using the technique on the equipment at the MSTR are more
mixed.
Currently, the concentrations of solutions of taggant elements dissolved in water
cannot be correctly measured. However, these results show high correlation coefficients
for single element solutions that are greater than 0.9. This indicates that for these solutions,
there is a systematic reason.

Calculating the concentration uses Equation 3.

Two

components of this equation are not experimental parameters and need to be determined
by other experiments. The first component, the thermal flux 𝛷&C , is not likely to be the
cause of the disparity. If an error in the thermal flux were the cause of this disparity, then
the magnitude of this disparity would be the same for each element that was measured.
However, the measured disparity is not constant. In fact, the measured disparity decreases
as the peak energy increases. This is what would be expected if this disparity were caused
by an error in determining the probability that a photon released by the sample interacts
with the detector.
This factor, 𝜀, is a function of the energy of the incident photon and decreases as
the energy of the incident photon increases. For the multi-element solutions, the correlation
coefficient is notably smaller. This indicates that the results for the multi-element standard
solution test series does not support or go against the possible causes shown by the single
element test series. It is possible that both factors are incorrect; the results from the single
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element standard solutions and multi-element standard solutions do not rule out this
possibility. Currently, it is possible to detect the presence of the taggant elements, but it is
not possible to correctly measure the concentration of the taggant elements.
5.9.2. Research Objective Two. The issue from objective one with accurately
determining the concentration of elements using NAA prevents any solid conclusions from
being drawn about the ability of the technique to resolve the concentration levels necessary
for the nuclear barcode to work. However, one conclusion that can be drawn from the
results is that obtaining many samples will produce a better measurement than only
obtaining one. For the nuclear barcode, this means that the post-blast residue should be
sampled from as many different locations as possible in order to accurately determine the
concentrations. The resolved concentrations for some tests hint that if the concentrations
can be accurately resolved, then NAA will be able to determine the different concentration
levels to the necessary degree of precision. The uncertainty in the measured concentration
for the single element solutions, which represents the best case scenario for these
measurements, is less than 100 ppb for 11 out of the 15 combinations of the three elements
at 5 concentrations. However, until this issue with correctly measuring the concentrations
is resolved, no conclusion can be accurately reached.
5.9.3. Research Objective Three. It was initially proposed that measurements of
the concentration of taggant elements would be taken from materials that might be present
in a post-detonation environment. This was proposed to ensure that the presence of the
taggant element and the concentration of the taggant element that was measured using
NAA would result only from the actual taggant, and not be from a naturally occurring
source. Initial tests on both binary and composition B explosives that were tagged with a
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single element showed no sign of the proposed taggant elements in the post-detonation
environment. Thus, this proposed series of tests was considered to be unnecessary since
performing NAA on the post-blast residue would collect the same information. In no tests
were the taggant elements interfering with reading one another, nor was there any
interference from peaks caused by an element present in the environment. The “noise”
caused by the presence of other peaks might be responsible for some of the measured
uncertainty in the concentrations, since this would increase the amount of background noise
and decrease the prominence of any peaks. Additionally, detector dead time is a factor to
consider as well, and a higher amount of other active isotopes will increase this dead time.
This dead time arises from the limit of the detector in counting and determining the energy
of many gammas simultaneously and is an inherent limit of the detector.
5.9.4. Research Objective Four. Despite the issue preventing accurate calculation
of the concentration of the taggant elements, it is likely the case that the concentration of
the taggant elements in the post-blast residue does not match the concentration of the
elements in the undetonated explosive. This is reasonable, since only a fraction of the mass
of the undetonated explosive ends up being deposited as post-blast residue. An altered
version of objective four then becomes “determine if the concentrations of the taggant
elements in the post-blast residue are a predictable function of the concentrations of the
taggant elements in the undetonated explosive”. This altered objective requires that the
concentrations of the taggant elements in the post-blast residue be accurately measured,
which has not yet been demonstrated.
In many tests, the taggant elements have been able to be identified in the post-blast
residues. However, in some of the tests, the taggant elements have not been able to be
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identified in the post-blast residues. A key parameter, then, is the delay between when the
sample is irradiated and when the sample is counted. This delay is necessary for the postblast residue containing samples as the detonation results in the deposition of other
elements onto the witness plates. Some of these elements become highly active after the
ten minute irradiation used, and become too active to safely handle the sample. This delay
allows for the samples to decay to a safer level of activity. The delay time requirement
was especially problematic for measurements of the comparatively short lived europium151m1 isotope. As a result, europium was rarely measured in the post-blast residue, despite
providing the best results in solutions. An analysis of the effect of this delay time on the
measured concentration and the uncertainty in the concentration measurement is presented
in Section 6.
These tests also observed much higher uncertainties in the calculated
concentrations that results from the low mass of post-blast residue that is collected.
Quantities of post-blast residue from the binary tests were approximately two orders of
magnitude larger than the amount of post-blast residue recovered from the tests using
Comp B. Lower uncertainties would be achieved when larger quantities of post-blast
residue have been obtained. This is another result in favor of requiring many samples of
post-blast residue in order to use the nuclear barcode as an identification taggant for
explosives. Multiple samples would permit averaging of the concentration of taggants
based on the total weight of post-blast residue recovered, which in theory could reduce the
contribution to uncertainty from the mass of post-blast residue. The low quantity of postblast residue recovered also means that correspondingly small amounts of taggant elements
are recovered, which may not be found due to being overwhelmed by background noise.
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The low quantity of post-blast residue recovered certainly did not help when trying to
identify the presence of the short lived europium-152m1 isotope in many samples.

5.10. SECTION SUMMARY
While performing the series of tests described in this section to evaluate the
survivability of the Nuclear Barcode in the post-blast residue, the critical parameters for
performing NAA were identified. A total of five key parameters that can be controlled
experimentally were identified. Each must be optimized to fully evaluate the performance
of NAA in this application in determining the concentration of the taggant elements. The
parameters are listed in Table 5.27, and use the notation for each variable from Equation
3.

Table 5.27. Five Key Parameters for Optimizing NAA
Variable

Variable Description

𝛷&C

Flux

𝜀

Efficiency

𝑡"
𝑡K
𝑡L

Irradiation time
Delay time
Counting time

How is it controlled/determined
Controlled by reactor used, and
power
Inherent to detector and sample
geometry
By experiment
By sequencing
By experiment

The effect of the delay time 𝑡K on the measured concentration and the uncertainty
in the measured was selected for further study. This parameter varied the most across and
within each test series. In the middle of testing the second of the five replicate samples of
the 500 ppb solution of samarium (described in Section 5.1), the detector being used failed,
and was not repaired for several days. This led to measurements of the remaining replicates
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being delayed, and they produced the highest measured uncertainty of any of the tested
solutions containing samarium. In comparison, holmium and europium tests, as well as
samarium tests excluding the 500 ppb samples, showed a trend of increased uncertainty
with increased concentrations.
Additionally, the variable delay time between irradiating and counting the samples
is the most likely cause of the inability to detect europium in almost all of the post-blast
residue samples. Since the presence of europium is indicated by measuring a greater
number of net counts than the uncertainty in the measurement of the number of net counts,
the delay time might have an effect.

The uncertainty in the mass and therefore

concentration of the taggant elements is also dependent on this relationship and should be
evaluated as well.
Finally, the delay time was permitted to vary so that samples could be handled
safely after being irradiated. The length of time where the sample was too active to
measure varied from sample to sample, and detector availability also played a role in this.
For these three reasons, an additional series of tests on the effect of delay time on measured
concentrations and measured concentration uncertainty was performed.
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6. DELAY TIME EFFECTS ON UNCERTAINTY

The delay time between irradiating and counting the sample was shown to be a key
determining factor in identifying the presence or absence of elements, as well as possibly
having an effect on the measured concentration or the uncertainty of the concentration
measurement. Based on these prior results, a series of experiments was performed to
evaluate the effect of the delay time on the measured concentration and the uncertainty.
To truly optimize NAA, the experimenter must optimize five of the quantities in Equation
3 (reproduced here from Section 2): 𝑡" , 𝑡L , 𝑡K , 𝛷&C , and 𝜀.

𝑚=𝐶

𝜆
((1 −

𝑒 /;&< )𝑒 /;&> (1 −

𝑒 /;&? )

∗

𝑀(
𝛷&C 𝜎DFF 𝛤𝜀𝜃𝑁J

6.1. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
Five identical samples of 1,000 ppb holmium solution were prepared at the same
time by successive dilution. The samples were placed into plastic vials and transferred by
the unshielded pneumatic or “rabbit” system to the core of the MSTR for 10 minutes when
operating at 200 kW. The samples were then retrieved using the same pneumatic system
and removed from the plastic vial once it was safe. Although these are the same power
and irradiation time parameters that were used for the tests in Section 5, the reactor core
configuration was changed between the end of the testing in Section 5 and the beginning
of the testing in Section 6. The reactor core configuration is the specific arrangement of
fuel rods, control rods, and other components in the reactor core. Changing the core
configuration could change the flux profile, and would make direct comparisons of the
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measured concentrations incorrect since the new flux profile was not known. These
samples were then counted 5 times for one hour each time over a 96 hour period. The
sample was counted 10 minutes after being irradiated, and the sample was also counted at
24 hour intervals after irradiation to observe the effect on the delay between irradiating and
counting the sample on the measured concentration. The detector used was an HPGe
detector operated at a voltage of 4500 V, and measurements were recorded using
Canberra’s ProSpect software.
The method for calculating the concentration of holmium in the samples used
Equation 3 from Section 2.2, the same as the tests in Section 5. The uncertainties in the
measured concentration were calculated in the same way as tests in Section 5 as well.
Uncertainties in the measured concentrations were derived by summing the partial
derivative of Equation 3 with respect to each variable, multiplied by the uncertainty in that
variable in quadrature to yield the uncertainty in the mass of the taggant element. The same
method for estimating the uncertainty was used for the equation to calculate the mass
concentration of the taggant element. Specifically, this means that the presented
uncertainties are not the same as the standard deviation in measured concentration. The
calculated uncertainties presented here give the minimum uncertainty in concentration that
can be obtained, while taking all variables into account. This analysis was used on the raw
spectrum obtained by NAA for each of the samples of the test series.
Holmium was used because it is a monoisotopic element, and prior experience has
shown that it produces only a few distinct gammas. This simplifies the subsequent analysis
and should mean that any observed effects are directly a result of the imposed delay time.
Holmium was dissolved in DI water to provide a clean background to identify the peaks.
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Another benefit of using holmium is that the half-life of the activated holmium is 26.8
hours, close to the 24 hour delay between irradiations. A 24 hour delay was used due to
scheduling and access limitations to the detector and reactor facilities at the MSTR.
Therefore, each of the 24 hour periods was approximately one half-life.

6.2. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The measured concentrations of each sample across each of the five measurements
are shown in Figure 6.1.

Measured Cocentration of Holmium (ppb)
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3.5

Sample 5

Figure 6.1. Delay Time Measured Concentrations (in ppb) of 1000 ppb Holmium
Dissolved in DI Water
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The samples were prepared with the same concentration. Sample 2 was measured
10 minutes earlier than all the other samples, due to experimenter error. This time
difference is much shorter than both the 24 hour period between measurements and also
the 28.6 hour half-life of activated holmium-166. Therefore, despite this difference in
when sample 2 was measured compared to the others, any errors from this should be
negligible, and sample 2’s measured concentrations can be directly compared to the other
samples. Samples 2 through 5 are all consistent with one another, having a measured
concentration between 2,100 ppb and 2,700 ppb. Sample 1 appears to be an outlier, as it
consistently has a lower concentration than any of the other samples after one day had
elapsed, despite the fact that all samples were prepared in such a manner that their
concentrations should be identical. On average, these five samples have a measured
concentration of holmium of 2,247 ppb, compared to 5,538 ppb from the previous 1,000
ppb holmium solutions. Since the detector and measurement methodology remained the
same, while the reactor configuration changed, the change in measured concentration must
come from the contribution from flux. This result supports the explanation that both the
thermal neutron flux parameter and the detector efficiency parameter are contributing to
the discrepancy in the measured concentrations seen in the previous section. There is no
consistent trend in the measured concentration as a function of the time delay across these
samples, as expected from the delay term that accounts for time in Equation 3.
The previous test results indicate that there might be some component to
uncertainty as a function of delay time, particularly the notably higher uncertainty found
in the 1,000 ppb samarium test. Uncertainty results are shown in Figure 6.2. Figure 6.2
shows a trend in the uncertainty in the concentration measurement as a function of delay
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time. Somewhere between 2.5 and 3 half-lives after irradiating the samples, the uncertainty
increased beyond its value when measured immediately after irradiating with no time
delay.

Concentration Uncertainty (ppb)
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Figure 6.2. Delay Time Measured Uncertainty (in ppb) of 1000 ppb Holmium Solution

Sodium was the only other element found in solution other than holmium, in the
form of Na-24. It is suspected that the presence of sodium-24 is what is responsible for the
noticeable dip in uncertainty for samples 1 and 3 after approximately one half-life. The
activated sodium also produces gammas while it decays, like holmium, which produces
additional background noise. Since Na-24 has a half-life of 14.99 hours compared to the
28.6 hour half-life of Ho-166, more sodium will decay than holmium in the given time
period. This should reduce the amount of background gammas produced by sodium
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compared to the quantity of gammas produced by holmium that is of interest, which would
produce lower uncertainties in the measured holmium concentration. If the contaminant
isotope has a longer half-life than the isotope being measured, this would not occur, and
measurements should be made as soon as possible.
The shape of the uncertainty curve appears to change over time. At low delay times,
below the critical 2.5 to 3 half-lives value, the uncertainty appears to increase at the same
rate with an average increase of 3.9 ppb from just under 1 half-life to over 1.5 half-lives
and 4.8 ppb from over 1.5 half-lives to just over 2.5 half-lives. At delay times above 2.5
half-lives, the slope increases to an average of 10.4 ppb. The method used to calculate the
uncertainty in the concentration sums the product of the derivative of Equation 3 with
respect to a variable and the uncertainty in that variable in quadrature. The different slopes
imply that above approximately 2.5 half-lives, the delay time component of this calculation
dominates the results, whereas below this time, another or multiple parameters from
equation 3 dominate the result for this particular test.

6.3. SECTION SUMMARY
The need for a delay between irradiating and measuring the samples due to
scheduling constraints led to unexpected results while evaluating objectives 1 through 4.
The uncertainty of the sample with the longest delay time was approximately double that
of the next highest uncertainty measurement. It was found that the uncertainty increases
as the concentration of the solution increases from 1,000 ppb to 4,000 ppb. However, the
highest uncertainty was found with 1,000 ppb solutions of samarium. This uncertainty is
also approximately 6 times that of the uncertainty measured in 1,000 ppb holmium which
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has a similar error in concentration measurements. The added delay time raised a question
of what effect this delay had on both the measured concentration of the taggant elements,
as well as the uncertainty of the concentration and prompted further testing using holmium
solutions at 1,000 ppb. Tests show that there is no noticeable trend in the measured
concentration as a function of delay time out to 3.5 half-lives for holmium but there was
for the uncertainly calculation. This testing supports the hypothesis that an error in the
thermal neutron flux combined with an error in the detector efficiency is the cause of the
inaccurate concentration measurements.
An increase in the uncertainty of the holmium concentration was observed when
comparing measurements made immediately after irradiating to measurements made after
2.5 to 3 half-lives. The uncertainty increased from a range between 7.8 ppb to 19.7 ppb at
10 minutes or approximately 0 half-lives after irradiation to a range of 10.8 ppb to 20.8 ppb
after approximately 2.5 half-lives. The behavior of the uncertainty in the period between
0 and 2.5 half-lives is less certain, due to the presence of sodium in the samples. Sodium
(14.997 hours) [39] has a shorter half-life than the holmium (28.6 hours) [39] that was
being measured, and would decay more rapidly. This effect would reduce the amount of
noise in the NAA spectrum, and also reduce the comparative uncertainty in measured
holmium concentration. In samples where this did not occur, there appears to be an
increase in the slope of the lines connecting adjacent measurements after approximately
2.5 to 3 half-lives from an average of 3.9 ppb (from just under 1 half-life to 1.7 half-lives)
to 10.4 ppb between 2.5 half-lives and 3.5 half-lives.

This means that the relative

contributions of the factors in the equation used to determine the uncertainty change when
entering this region.
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These results show that after this period of approximately 2.5 half-lives, the
measured uncertainty in the concentration becomes dominated by the delay time.
Therefore, to minimize the uncertainty in the concentration for holmium solutions, they
should be counted within 67 hours of irradiating the samples. This same 2.5 half-lives
criteria can be applied to the two other elements that were tested in Section 5. Europium
concentrations, specifically Eu-152m1 should be counted within 23 hours and samarium
concentrations should be counted within 115 hours.
Combining the results from the testing in Section 5 with this result, it can be
concluded that elements with a half-life of below 19.2 hours are unsuitable for use with the
nuclear barcode. This eliminates the use of europium from consideration for use with the
nuclear barcode. A 19.2 hour half-life means that the expected 48 hour delay time between
measuring and counting the samples from Section 5 is already greater than 2.5 half-lives.
As such, even if the element can be identified after this length of time, unlike europium,
the uncertainty will already start to be dominated by the delay time. If this occurs, it will
be extremely unlikely that the uncertainty in the concentration will remain below 50 ppb.
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7. DISCUSSION

7.1. TAGGANT SURVIVABILITY
Historically, taggants have been investigated as a response to proposed laws which
are themselves responses to crimes and terrorist actions. Regrettably, since terrorism is
inevitable, further legal restrictions on explosives will occur. Previously, proposed laws
have required the implementation of identification taggants in explosives. These would
provide information that would aid law enforcement in investigating crimes involving these
explosives. This idea appears to be attractive and has been proposed for a period of 40
years [1, 2]. After the next or the subsequent major terrorist attack in the United States,
this pattern suggests that identification taggants will become required in the United States.
As such, having a fully developed and characterized identification taggant ready to be
deployed would prove to be a great advantage when that occurs. Figure 7.1 shows the
position of the nuclear barcode on the timeline of explosive legislation and taggant efforts.
The Nuclear Barcode is an identification taggant that gets its name from nature of
the technique of neutron activation analysis. This nuclear technique has been used in the
semiconductor industry to analyze the impurities in the ultrapure wafers down to the parts
per billion level to ensure that they can be used to manufacture the chips modern
technology relies on [30]. Archeologists use this technique to analyze the composition of
pottery and match the combinations of trace elements, typically rare earths, to determine
where the clay that was used came from. This information can be used to determine ancient
trade routes and cultural spheres of influence [40].
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Figure 7.1. Nuclear Barcode’s Position on Timeline of Explosive Legislation and
Taggant Efforts

These two uses of NAA suggest a good candidate identification taggant for
explosives: introduce very small, parts per billion level quantities of trace elements during
manufacture. Utilizing a unique combination of these elements would create a way of
tracing manufactured explosives.
The nuclear barcode’s performance is compared to the performance of other taggant
technologies in Table 7.1, which adds the nuclear barcode to Table 2.5 on the same one to
five scale, with a score of five meaning the taggant technology performs extremely well in
that category or is incredibly cheap, and a score of one meaning the opposite. The nuclear
barcode scores highly across all criteria. Post-blast residues are produced by every
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Table 7.1. Comparison of Different Taggant Technologies with Nuclear Barcode
Taggant
Radiological
[1]
Chemical
[2, 1]
Physical (or
Particulate)
[2, 1]
Isotopic [2]
Biological
[2]
Nuclear
Barcode

Recoverability Survivability

Utility

Compatibility Cost
with
Explosives

Total
Score

5

5

3

5

4

22

3

3

5

4

3

21

5

5

4

4

4

22

5

5

5

5

1

21

3

3

5

5

2

18

5

5

5

5

4

24

detonation, and can be collected with a cotton ball, giving the nuclear barcode a high
recoverability score. The taggant elements are not destroyed during detonation, giving it a
high score in the survivability category. The ability to produce many unique codes gives
the nuclear barcode its high utility score. At the low concentrations used, the taggant
elements that make up the nuclear barcode are compatible with explosives. And the high
cost of taggant materials is mitigated by the extremely low concentrations enabled by the
accuracy of NAA. In total, the nuclear barcode exceeds, on a design basis, the scores of
all earlier taggant categories.
Testing of aqueous solutions containing three candidate taggant elements
(holmium, samarium, and europium) as well as post-blast residues of explosives that had
these elements introduced was performed. It was found that the mass of the post-blast
residue that was recovered from tests using Composition B as an explosive was

131
approximately two orders of magnitude less than the quantity of post-blast residue that was
recovered from tests using binary explosive. This testing at the MSTR produced inaccurate
measurements of the concentrations of the taggant elements.

The sources of this

inaccuracy were reduced to five possible NAA parameters: the neutron flux that the
samples are exposed to; the efficiency of the detector used; the length of time the sample
is irradiated; the length of time the sample is counted; and the delay time, the length of
time between the irradiation and counting of the sample.
This prompted an experiment to be carried out on the effect of the delay time
between irradiating and counting the sample on the uncertainty in the measurement. This
experiment was performed based on interesting results in the uncertainties that occurred
when scheduling at the MSTR, equipment malfunction, or the variable time needed for an
irradiated sample to cool sufficiently to be safely handled caused longer than expected
delays. For these experiments it was assumed that although the measurements of the
absolute concentration and concentration uncertainty were incorrect, any trends in the
observed measurements were real. It was further assumed that the magnitude of these
effects would likely change when correct measurements of the concentration could be
taken, but they would not disappear.
Using these assumptions, it was observed that the uncertainty in the measured
concentration increases once the delay time exceeds a critical value of approximately 2.5
or 3 half-lives. Additionally, the increase in uncertainty as delay time increases appears to
be constant for most samples from immediately after irradiating until the critical value.
However, after the critical value, the uncertainty appears to increase faster. This implies
that there are two regions in the measured uncertainty: after the critical delay time the
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measured uncertainty is dominated only by the delay time, whereas before the critical delay
time, the measured uncertainty is dominated by at least one factor that is not the delay time.

7.2. NUCLEAR BARCODE MATERIALS COSTS
The Nuclear Barcode uses low concentrations of taggant elements for two purposes.
The first is to make the Nuclear Barcode stealthy, or difficult to detect without specialized
equipment and knowledge. It is expected that this difficulty will make the Nuclear Barcode
extremely difficult to fake by most groups. The second purpose is to reduce the material
cost. Rare earth and platinum group metals are used because of their superior properties
when it comes to NAA, however these metals are also expensive. Iridium is the most
expensive metal, with a price of approximately $1,200 per troy ounce in 2018. This puts
iridium metal at approximately $40 per gram. Assuming that the average concentration of
iridium used in a unique tag is 2,000 ppb, then one gram of iridium could be used to tag
500 kg of explosives, and would add a cost of $0.08 per kg of explosive, or $0.036 per
pound. The other elements used are not nearly expensive, so the major materials cost driver
of the Nuclear Barcode will be iridium in normal economic circumstances. This is a small
increase in the total price, and can be further mitigated by reducing the concentrations of
relatively expensive metals like iridium, rhenium, and europium, and increasing the
concentrations of relatively cheap metals such as holmium or samarium.
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMMENDATIONS

8.1. CONCLUSIONS
8.1.1. Taggant Survivability. The survivability of the Nuclear Barcode was
assessed by the tests described in Section 4.

The conclusions listed below are directly

shown by the results presented in Section 5.

•

All three taggant elements tested (holmium, samarium, europium) can be
identified by NAA

•

All three taggant elements tested can be identified in aqueous solutions at
concentrations of 100 ppb and above

•

All three taggant elements have distinct peaks that are separated from the
peaks produced by the other taggant elements

•

All three taggant elements have been identified in the post-blast residue.

•

Other elements present in the post-blast residue do not interfere with
identifying the peaks of the three taggant elements or measuring the number
of counts under these peaks.
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•

Short half-life of europium makes it hard to detect in the post-blast residue
due to the length of the delay time required to safely handle and measure
the samples.

•

The introduction of the taggants, either as aqueous solutions or solid salts
did not affect the performance of the explosives which detonated in every
test.

8.1.2. Delay Time Effects on Uncertainty. The effects of delay time on the
uncertainty in the measured concentration were tested in Section 6. The conclusions listed
below follow from these results.

•

Concentration measurements stay approximately constant.

•

Equation 3 is verified to be accurately compensating for the delay time.

•

Uncertainty in the measured concentration increases as delay time
increases.

•

After approximately 2.5 half-lives, the uncertainty in the measured
concentration is greater than when measured immediately after irradiating.
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•

The change in uncertainty in the measured concentration increases as the
delay time increases.

•

Uncertainty in the measured concentration increases faster from 2.5 halflives to 3.5 half-lives than at any other times measured.

•

The effect of the delay time dominates uncertainty in measured
concentration after 2.5 half-lives.

8.2. NUCLEAR BARCODE RECOMMENDATIONS
This research has shown that explosives tagged with holmium, samarium, and
europium have some potential for use as an identification taggant. These elements can be
detected by NAA in the post-blast residue produced by detonation of the tagged explosive,
and collected by sampling a piece of material where these detonation products settle.
Neutron activation analysis is a proven method for analyzing concentrations, but the
method used in this research is not able to accurately determine the concentrations. While
using NAA, it is important to understand the contribution of the delay time to the overall
uncertainty. Although it is not always possible due to safety concerns, samples should
ideally be counted within one half-life of the activated isotopes after irradiation to obtain
the results with the lowest uncertainty, and to ensure that all of the taggant elements are
identified, and no later than 2.5 half-lives after irradiating. Table 8.1 lists the maximum
delay time corresponding to 2.5 half-lives after irradiating the eight elements identified as
possible candidates (Eu, Dy, Ho, Lu, Sm, Ir, Re, and Rh), assuming they behave similarly
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to holmium [27]. Due to the problems observed with detecting the activated form of
europium in the post-blast residue, any element used in the Nuclear Barcode should have
a half-life of longer than 10 hours. It has been observed from the post-blast tests that an
approximately 48 hour delay is the minimum required to safely handle the samples when
irradiated under the test conditions used. This would eliminate any elements that have a
maximum delay time of less than 48 hours.

Table 8.1. Maximum Delay Time for Candidate Elements
Element
Europium
Dysprosium
Holmium
Lutetium
Samarium
Iridium
Rhenium
Rhodium

Active Isotope

Half-Life

Eu-152m1
Dy-159
Ho-166
Lu-177
Sm-153
Ir-194
Re-186
Rh-104

9.2 hours
144.4 days
26.8 hours
6.6 days
46.3 hours
19.3 hours
3.7 days
42.3 seconds

Maximum Delay
Time
23.1 hours
361 days
67 hours
16.6 days
115.7 hours
48.2 hours
9.3 days
105.8 seconds

As Table 8.1 shows, this eliminates the use of Eu-152m1 and Rh-104, with Ir-194
falling just beyond this cutoff. Europium produces other isotopes as well, but these were
not found during testing of aqueous solutions of europium. The significantly longer halflives of Eu-152 and Eu-154 (13.5 and 8.6 years respectively) would require that the sample
be measured soon after irradiation for shorter lived isotopes such as holmium and
samarium, and then would need to be measured again after several weeks or months have
elapsed to identify the concentration of europium in the sample. This would drastically
increase the time required for testing and therefore slow down any criminal investigation.
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Rhodium produces no other isotopes during irradiation. Due to their short half-lives,
europium and rhodium should not be used in the Nuclear Barcode unless that limitation
can be overcome.
Of the remaining six elements, the only concern is the particularly long lived Dy159 isotope. Longer lived isotopes produce fewer gammas per unit of time, and thus would
require longer counting times. A solution that might overcome this issue would be to
perform a 1 hour count as soon as possible to identify the five elements that are not
eliminated. After this count, a longer 8, 16, or 24 hour count might yield enough gammas
from Dy-159 to accurately identify the concentration. Assuming this is the case, and that
no other elements are introduced, this reduces the maximum, theoretical, total number of
unique combinations from 408 to 406. This results in a total of 4.1 billion potential
combinations for use with the Nuclear Barcode.
Utilizing some assumptions, the utility of the 4.1 billion codes can be estimated. In
the US, 3.1 million metric tons of explosives were sold for use in 2014 [6]. Assuming that
the US represents approximately 20 to 25% of the world explosive market, the global
production and sale of explosives in one year is 15.5 million metric tons. Assuming that
the average size of a batch of explosives is 5000 kg, or just over 10,000 pounds, then for
an identification taggant scheme that uses a unique code per batch of explosives a total of
3.1 million unique codes will be used to tag one year of production. Not all explosive
products are produced in the same size batch, with specialist products such as boosters or
dynamite produced in much smaller quantities than ANFO.

To account for these

variations, it will be assumed that 10 times more codes are required than estimated based

138
on the batch size of 5000 kg, meaning that 31 million unique codes must be used each year.
At this rate, the 4.1 billion codes produced by the nuclear barcode will last for 132 years
before having to repeat codes. This should be a sufficient length of time, as most
companies do not survive for 130 years, let alone retain consumables for this length of
time.
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9. FUTURE WORK

The research presented here was performed in the greater context of developing an
identification taggant for explosives that encodes information about the explosive in a
unique combination of concentrations of several uncommon elements. The results of this
research show that while the presence of these elements can be identified in many
circumstances, it is not currently possible to accurately measure the concentration of the
three candidate taggant elements at the MSTR. This must be corrected before any further
research on a taggant like the Nuclear Barcode is performed.
This research suggests two explanations for the inability to measure the
concentrations. First, the efficiency of the detector as a function of the energy of the
incident gamma ray needs to be well characterized.

A factor complicating this

characterization is that there is a geometric component to this efficiency. The detector is
relatively small (2 inch by 2 inch), and therefore only some gammas will be encountered
by the detector and potentially be measured. A method to ensure that the geometric
component is consistent will be needed. Secondly, more recent tests suggest that the
reactor flux profile has changed since it was last measured. Characterizing the reactor flux
profile can be done using the ASTM E262 standard method. An alternative method would
be to perform future irradiations simultaneously with a reference standard. Once these two
parameters are determined, it will be possible to determine if the concentration
measurement problems that this research has encountered are due solely to the
aforementioned factors, or a product of the Nuclear Barcode taggant method.

140
In addition to characterizing the detector efficiency and the reactor flux, to truly
optimize NAA results, it is necessary to optimize the irradiation time, the counting time,
and the delay time. This research presents results on the effect of increasing the delay time
on the uncertainty in the concentration measurement. The effects of the other four
parameters must be resolved as well to optimize the effectiveness of NAA.
The measured uncertainty in the concentration of the taggant elements was most
dependent on two factors.

For the single and multi-element standard solutions,

approximately 80 to 90% of the uncertainty was from the uncertainty in the number of
counts under the peak used. Future work to improve this by counting for a longer time, or
using some other means to reduce this contribution would vastly reduce the uncertainties
in these measurements. For post-blast samples, and especially the Composition B postblast samples, the mass of post-blast residue recovered was often a significant contribution
to the measured uncertainty. In order to calculate the uncertainty of the post-blast samples,
the mass of the element measured using NAA is calculated using Equation 3. This mass is
then divided by the mass of the collected post-blast residue. The measured uncertainty
takes the total derivative of this equation with respect to both masses. Therefore, when the
mass of the post-blast residue is approximately equal to the minimum that the balance can
measure, the measured uncertainty becomes completely dominated by the total mass of
post-blast residue and the uncertainty in the measurement of the mass of post-blast residue
that is recovered.
This work utilized the one group approximation for neutron flux in the derivation
of Equation 3, and assumed that all neutrons were thermalized in the reactor and reduced
to low energies. Future work should include the resonance integral contribution in this
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derivation, since the resonance integral for the elements holmium, samarium, and europium
is large, and therefore any intermediate energy neutrons will have a high probability of
being captured. Adding this term will reduce the measured concentration of the taggant
elements in all measurements. The magnitude of this effect will depend on both the
resonance integrals of the taggant elements and the intermediate flux of the MSTR.
Utilizing taggants on a research scale presented special challenges. Ways to
optimally introduce the taggant elements into the explosives and to ensure that they are
evenly mixed throughout the undetonated explosive need to be investigated. This research
introduced the taggant elements as aqueous solutions of sulfate salts into the liquid phase
of the binary explosive (nitromethane) or to liquid Composition B before casting. Some
experiments also introduced the salts directly into either of these two phases. Regardless
of how the taggant was introduced, the liquid phase was stirred thoroughly before being
mixed with the solid phase (in the case of the binary explosive) or cast and allowed to cool
(in the case of Composition B). The small quantities of taggants needed to tag the
explosives at the concentrations desired made it impossible to verify that the salts or
solutions were evenly mixed throughout the explosive, and it was hoped that any poor
mixing would be compensated by additional mixing that would occur during detonation.
Ethanol based solutions containing rare earth elements were tested previously and would
likely have higher miscibility with the liquid phases, but prior research noted that the use
of ethanol sensitized tagged explosives [1].
Further research will also need to be performed on the effect of the delay time
between irradiating and counting a sample. It is assumed that the results presented in this
accurately show the presence or absence of the different elements by measuring a total
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number of net counts greater than the uncertainty in this number. Tests on solutions of
holmium show that the ratio of uncertainty to net counts sometimes decreases after a short
number of half-lives when an element with a shorter half-life than the taggant element is
present. This might allow for future variations of the Nuclear Barcode to use lower
concentrations or have more concentration levels if the effect persists.
Further experiments on the delay time and the measured uncertainty should also be
carried out and extended to longer delay times. Short delay times showed a critical delay
time of approximately 2.5 to 3 half-lives was when the uncertainty in the measured
concentration became dominated by delay time effects. Assuming this result can be
reproduced, carrying out tests beyond 4 half-lives would prove useful as the isotope of
europium used in the post-blast tests had a delay time between 7 and 10 half-lives. Any
change of behavior in this range would strengthen the observation made in Section 6 that
a change in the rate at which the uncertainty in the measured concentration is increasing
indicates a change in the relative magnitudes of the delay time contribution.
Future testing of the Nuclear Barcode should be performed before determining if it
is a viable identification taggant. The tests below are ordered based on the current state of
the Nuclear Barcode and where the most significant improvements can be found, with the
first five being more important than the final two.

•

Calibrate the HPGe detector so that accurate measurements by NAA can be
obtained.

•

Accurately determine the flux profile of the MSTR.
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•

Determine optimal counting time for each taggant element and reduce the
uncertainty in the number of counts under a peak by an order of magnitude.

•

Methods of adding and evenly mixing the taggant with the explosive during
the manufacturing process.

•

Determine feasibility of utilizing longer-lived isotopes such as Eu-152 and
Dy-159 in the Nuclear Barcode.

•

Effect of sample geometry and orientation on measurement of
concentrations.

•

Effect of distance from site of the blast to the sampling area on the measured
concentration of taggant elements.

Assuming these extra tests are successful, then the Nuclear Barcode is most likely
a survivable identification taggant. Taggants in Explosives and Marking and Rendering
Inert identified other characteristics in addition to survivability necessary for the
widespread adoption of identification taggants: recoverability, utility for law enforcement,
compatibility with explosives, safety in manufacture and use, no effect on explosive
performance, compatibility with mined products, environmental acceptability, and cost of
a taggant program. A future, full evaluation of an identification taggant program should
test the performance of an identification taggant in these areas.
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APPENDIX A.
DETAILED CALCULATION OF CONCENTRATIONS BY NEUTRON
ACTIVATION ANALYSIS
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This appendix provides a detailed, step-by-step calculation of the concentration of
the taggant elements found in one sample. All concentrations in the previous sections were
calculated using this method. Equation 3, first presented in Section 2.2, describes how to
calculate the mass of any element found in a sample when performing NAA. This equation
was used to determine the mass of the taggant elements used in the course of the
experiments described in the previous sections: holmium, samarium, and europium. From
these masses, concentrations of these taggant elements could then be obtained by dividing
the mass of the taggant element(s) found by the total mass of the analyzed sample.
Equation 3 is reproduced below for ease of reference.

𝑚=𝐶

𝜆
((1 −

𝑒 /;&< )𝑒 /;&> (1

−

𝑒 /;&? )

∗

𝑀(
𝛷&C 𝜎DEF 𝛤𝜀𝜃𝑁J

Of the 13 terms used in equation 3 to calculate the mass, two are universal
constants: 𝑒, the base of the natural logarithm; and 𝑁J , Avogadro’s number, and can be
obtained from any number of references. Five of these quantities are constants that depend
on the element that is being investigated: 𝜆, the decay constant for the activated isotope of
the element (that is, the isotope of the element that has captured a neutron during
irradiation, and calculated by dividing ln(2) by the half-life of the isotope in seconds) under
investigation; 𝑀( , the molecular weight of the nonactivated isotope of the element; 𝜎DEF ,
the probability that a neutron is absorbed by the nucleus of the nonactivated isotope (under
a one group assumption where it is assumed that all neutrons can be assumed to be
thermalized, the value used is the thermal capture cross section); 𝛤, the fraction of all
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radioactive decays by an activated isotope that produce a gamma ray of the energy being
investigated; and 𝜃, the natural abundance of the nonactivated isotope of the element (the
fraction of all atoms of this element that are the specific isotope that’s activation is being
investigated). These four values can be obtained from reference sources such as the
IAEA’s Nuclear Data Service.
Three parameters are set by the experimenter: 𝑡" , the time that the sample is
irradiated; 𝑡L , the time that gamma rays are counted by the detector, and 𝑡K , the delay time
between irradiating and counting the sample. The first two time parameters are set in
advance by the experimenter, the third parameter is often set by scheduling constraints.
The MSTR takes approximately 60-90 minutes to start up and reach the power used by
these experiments. As the irradiation time used is only 10 minutes, and samples are being
counted for one hour, it is inefficient to start up the reactor to irradiate only one sample,
and operating the reactor with no sample in it for 50 minutes between samples is not
practically feasible either. As a result, several samples were typically irradiated at the same
time, and then counted over the course of a day or several days. This resulted in a range
of delay times used, and prompted an investigation of the effects of the delay time that is
shown in Section 6.
Ten of the thirteen parameters are therefore set by the experimenter or are standard
values that can be found in references. The next parameter, 𝐶, is the number of counts in
the peak at the gamma energy corresponding to the element being investigated that is
measured by the detector.

Modern detectors are generally made from high purity

germanium (HPGe) that is cooled by liquid nitrogen.
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These detectors are intrinsic semiconductors and when a gamma photon hits the
detector, it triggers a cascade of physical reactions by electrons that produce a signal that
can be measured. This signal can be separated using microprocessors based on the energy
of the gamma photon that hit the detector. HPGe detectors are sensitive to photons in the
range of approximately 10 keV to approximately 3000 keV depending on the exact model
of detector used. This energy range is broken down into a number of different ‘channels’
or ‘bins’ with a typical number being 16384 unique energies (214). The second last
parameter, 𝜀, is the efficiency of the detector. This efficiency is a measurement of the
probability that a gamma photon emitted by an activated isotope interacts with the detector
and produces a signal in the electronics that is then recorded. The last parameter, 𝛷&C is
the neutron flux that the sample is exposed to during irradiation. At the MSTR, this
parameter was assumed to be the thermal flux produced by the reactor while operating at
its full, 200 kW power limit. It is assumed, for the purposes of these calculations, that the
flux is described only by neutrons that have been thermalized (that is, have a kinetic energy
between 0 eV and 0.0273 eV) by interacting with the water used to cool the core. Prior
measurements by Dr. Castano and others established that the overwhelming proportion of
the flux produced by the MSTR falls within the range of thermal neutrons. These last two
parameters must be determined by experiment before they can be used to calculate the mass
using NAA.
The measured counts from the detector are fed into a software program called
ProSpect. One component of this software produces a report which summarizes the
spectrum and provides counts and uncertainties in the counts for the number of gamma
photons at certain peaks. A full report is shown below as Figure A.1.
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life)
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)
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Figure A.1. ProSpect Report Holmium Delay Time Sample 3, (~1 half-life) (cont.)
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Of the ten pages of the report, only two numbers are relevant to calculating the mass
of the taggant element holmium [the sample was a 0.5 mL sample of 1 ppm holmium
dissolved in DI water]. They are the total counting time shown in the red box on page 7
(3753.380 seconds), and the net area under the peak with a centroid at 80.46 keV which is
the number in the fourth column of the row surrounded by a blue square on page 8 of the
report (234933.092 ± 979.764 counts). It should be noted that in reality, it is impossible to
have a fraction of a count, and therefore there should only be a whole number of counts.
The fraction of a count arises from the method by which the net area under the peak is
determined. First, the total area under the peak is measured by summing the counts for all
of the channels that are part of the peak. Then, the average counts of the channels near but
outside the peak are taken. These counts are assumed to represent the background, counts
that arise from reflections or reemissions of gamma photons and do not correspond to any
particular element. The average number of counts multiplied by the number of channels
that make up the peak is then subtracted from the total area under the peak. This produces
the net number of counts under a peak, and will almost always result in some fractional
number of counts. For most peaks, the number of counts is very high, so rounding the
counts to the nearest whole number will have no effect. The values for the parameters used
to calculate the concentration of holmium in this example are shown in Table A.1 along
with the uncertainties in these values.
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Table A.1. Holmium mass calculation parameters
Parameter
𝑒
𝑁J
𝜆
𝑀(
𝜎DEF
𝛤
𝜃
𝑡"
𝑡L
𝑡K
𝐶
𝜀
𝛷&C

Value

Units

2.71828
6.022*1023
7.17793*10-6
164.930328
6.47*10-23
0.0656
1
600
3,753.380
87,000
234,933.092
0.051
2.94*1012

atoms/mol
1/s
g/mol
cm2
s
s
s
counts
1/(cm2*s)

Uncertainty in
value (𝑢" )
n/a
7.4*1015
3.21111*10-9
2.7*10-6
1.2*10-24
0.0013
n/a
5
1
8
979.764
0.0024
1.9*1010

These parameters are then inserted into equation 3 from the main body to produce equation
1.

𝑚 = 234,933.092 ∗
(7.17793 ∗ 10/\ )
(]1 − 𝑒 /(^.0^^_`∗0abc)∗\aa d𝑒 /(^.0^^_`∗0abc)∗e^aaa ]1 − 𝑒 /(^.0^^_`∗0abc )∗`,^f`.`ea d
164.930328
(1)
∗
0N
/N`
NN
(2.94 ∗ 10 ) ∗ (6.47 ∗ 10 ) ∗ 0.0656 ∗ 0.051 ∗ 1 ∗ (6.022 ∗ 10 )

This calculates a mass of 1.182*10-5 grams of holmium in the sample. In 0.5 mL of water
at room temperature, the number of molecules of water is given by:
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𝑔
𝑚𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠
0.5 𝑚𝐿 ∗ 0.9984 𝑚𝐿 ∗ 6.022 ∗ 10N`
𝑚𝑜𝑙
18.0098 𝑔/𝑚𝑜𝑙

= 1.6689 ∗ 10NN

(2)

Therefore, the concentration of holmium atoms in the water in parts per billion is equal to:

10N` atoms
Ho
mol
10_ ppb ∗ 1.182 ∗ 10/f g Ho ∗
Ho
164.930328 g mol Ho
6.022 ∗

1.6689 ∗ 10NN molecules 𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 + 1.182 ∗ 10/f g Ho ∗ 6.022 ∗
= 2586. 80 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝐻𝑜 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛

10N` atoms
Ho
mol

(3)

The uncertainty in the measured concentration can also be calculated using neutron
activation analysis, assuming that all of the measurement errors are normally distributed
and that the uncertainty values, 𝑢" listed in Table A.1 are acceptable estimates of the
standard deviation of the measured quantity. Under these assumptions, the uncertainty in
the calculated mass, 𝑢L , of the taggant holmium in this sample can be calculated by
summing the product of the derivative of equation 3 with respect to each variable by the
uncertainty in the value of each variable in equation 3 in quadrature, which is expressed
below in equations 4 (reproduced from Section 2) and 4.

𝑢L

N

𝜕𝑚 N
= O PQ T ∗ 𝑢" N U
𝜕𝑥"
"
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𝑢L N

𝜕
𝜆
𝑀(
= O †‡
ˆ𝐶
∗
‰Š 𝑢" N ‹
/;&
/;&
/;&
𝜕𝑥"
((1 − 𝑒 < )𝑒 > (1 − 𝑒 ? ) 𝛷&C 𝜎DEF 𝛤𝜀𝜃𝑁J

(4)

"

Taking the necessary derivatives and inserting the correct values into equation 6
gives a calculated uncertainty in the mass of the taggant of 4.93*10-9 grams.

The

uncertainty in the concentration of the taggant element can be calculated using the same
method. The derivative of each component of the equation is multiplied by the uncertainty
in the measurements, and then summed in quadrature.

Performing this calculation

produces an uncertainty in the concentration measurement equal to 10.79 ppb. This process
was carried out for each test where concentrations were determined.
Of these parameters, many remain the same across all the elements tested. The
individual parameters that change when Equation 3 is used to calculate concentrations of
samarium and europium are shown below in Table A.2, along with the corresponding
values for holmium. The listed value for the parameter 𝜃 is the natural abundance of the
isotope Eu-151 (0.5219) multiplied by the probability that an atom of Eu-151 becomes the
metastable isotope Eu-152m1 (0.3176712) when it captures a neutron during irradiation.

Table A.2 Comparison of variable parameters in Equation 3 when used with various
elements
Parameter [unit]
𝜆 [1/s]
𝑀( [amu]
𝜎DEF [cm2]
𝛤
𝜃
𝜀

Holmium
7.17793*10-6
164.930328
6.47*10-23
0.0656
1
0.051

Samarium
4.15999*10-6
152.9220974
2.06*10-22
0.0473
0.2675
0.051

Europium
2.06775*10-5
151.9217445
9.2*10-21
0.024
0.1658
0.033
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APPENDIX B.
CALCULATION OF DETECTOR EFFICIENCY AT 69.9 KEV, 80.6 KEV, AND
344.3 KEV
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The procedure used to calculate the efficiency of the detector used for the three key
energies corresponding to samarium, holmium, and europium is described here. A NIST
traceable, multi-element standard is available at the reactor manufactured by Eckert and
Ziegler (certificate of calibration 91818). The standard consisted of a 3 mm thick disk of
material suspended half way up a 20 mm diameter by 2 inch long plastic NAA vial. This
standard was then placed in the middle of the same HPGe detector used in Section 5 and
6, and counted for 1 hour using Canberra’s ProSpect software to collect the data. Any
identifiable peaks were measured, and the net counts per second of these peaks were
divided by the calibration results after correcting for the time between calibration and
measurement to give the detector efficiency. The uncertainty was obtained by dividing the
uncertainty in the measured net counts per second of the peaks by the expected counts per
second. This process was performed for both detectors used. Table B.1 shows the energy
of the peaks identified, the corresponding isotopes, the expected number of counts per
second based on the time between certification and when the measurements were
performed, the measured number of counts per second, and detector efficiency in %, and
the uncertainty in the detector efficiency in % for the second detector that was used for the
vast majority of the testing (>90% of tests). This detector efficiency is the product of the
geometric efficiency (how many gammas emitted by the sample end up interacting with
the detector) and the inherent detector efficiency (the probability that an interaction
between a gamma photon and the detector produces a signal in the detector that is amplified
and measured). As none of the taggant elements used in this research were used in the
standard, both the efficiency of the detector at the desired energies, and the uncertainty in
the efficiency were obtained by linear interpolation.
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Table B.1. Detector Efficiency Measurements for Second Detector used
Peak
Energy
(keV)
59.5
88.0
122.1
661.7
1173.2
1332.5

Isotope
Am-241
Cd-109
Co-57
Cs-137
Co-60
Co-60

Expected
Counts per
Second
1999.0
219.6
19.4
1738.8
1964.6
1965.1

Measured
Counts per
Second
115.5
12.4
0.9
19.5
12.7
11.3

Detector
efficiency
(%)
5.8
5.6
4.8
1.1
0.6
0.6

Efficiency
Uncertainty
(%)
0.02
0.07
0.50
0.01
0.01
0.00

Table B.2 presents the interpolated detector efficiencies of the 80.6 keV peak for
holmium, the 69.9 keV peak for samarium, and the 344.3 keV peak for europium 152m1.

Table B.2. Detector Efficiencies for Holmium, Samarium, and Europium Peaks
Element
Samarium
Holmium
Europium

Peak Energy (keV)
69.6
80.6
344.3

Interpolated
Efficiency (%)
5.1
5.2
3.3

Interpolated
Uncertainty (%)
0.22
0.24
0.07
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APPENDIX C.
EXPANDED FIGURE 5.1
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Figure 5.1 includes multiple elements in the same diagram. The error bars represent
the standard deviation in the measured concentrations of the taggant element. Figures C.1
through C.3 show the individual elements that comprise Figure 5.1 on the same vertical
scale. Figure C.4 shows the data for europium on a more natural scale, and is zoomed in
compared to Figure 5.1.
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Figure C.1. Holmium Data in Figure 5.1

The measurements for 100 ppb and 500 ppb holmium are not comparable to the
rest of the measurements. These measurements were used to determine the detector
efficiency by assuming that they were measured correctly. The data for samarium are also
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questionable. The detector broke after measuring all five of the 100 ppb samples, and one
of the 500 ppb samples. All samples were irradiated at the same time, since counting was
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Figure C.2. Samarium Data in Figure 5.1

expected to take only a couple days. When the detector broke, this introduced a delay time
of up to a week in the case of the 4,000 ppb samples, which is responsible for the substantial
error bars seen in Figure C.2. As such, these data are being presented for the sake of
completeness.
Figure C.3 shows europium, and the data here look far more linear than either the
holmium or samarium samples. Figure C.4 confirms this, as the data still appear highly
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linear when zoomed in. A strange result is that the standard deviation of the europium
2,000 ppb samples are larger than those of the 4,000 ppb samples. Additionally, these two
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Figure C.3. Europium Data in Figure 5.1

test series each have one outlier result, which was discarded when calculating the standard
deviation. The reason for this is unknown, but since both outliers were the fifth of five
samples at the same concentration, it is possible there was insufficient mixing of the
original solutions that the samples were drawn from. This would create a concentration
gradient and therefore produce outliers.
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Figure C.4. Europium Data in Figure 5.1 (Zoomed)
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